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Abstract
This thesis presents a new theory of control in which the control predicate establishes
control between PRO and the controller by Agreeing with both of them and checking
their semantics at a later point of the derivation. Each DP possesses its own index as a
syntactic feature. As the predicate Probes for these two Goals, it keeps track of the
indexes of the controllee and controller with the control calculus, a part of the narrow
syntax. The calculus is sensitive to the semantics of these nominal phrases after transfer
to LF. This derives subject control in (1), which Culicover & Jackendoff (2001) argue
exists due to the lexical semantic role Source on the Agent θ-role of promise.
(1) Johni promised Maryk PROi to eat pizza.
If the set containing the index of the controller is a subset of the set containing the index
of the controllee, the derivation does not crash; otherwise, it crashes. This approach
provides a derivation for the phenomenon of split control in (2), which Landau (2013)
points out no account to date has been able to solve, and derives partial control in (3),
along with deriving many other control phenomena.
(2) Johni promised Maryk PROi+k to meet at 6. (because {i} ∪ {k} ⊆ {i+k})
(3) Johni tried PROi+ to meet up at 6. (because {i} ⊆ {i+})
A major consequence of this solution is that it rejects the autonomy of syntax as
proposed by Chomsky (1957); syntax provides a basis for semantics, which is not
included in the grammar. But this paper argues that control phenomena show the need
for a unified syntax and semantics approach to control, where both play a part in
deriving sentences.
 
 
 
CONTROL AS MULTIPLE AGREE  
 
by 
Deniz Alp Satik 
 
B.A., University of Massachusetts at Amherst, 2015 
 
Thesis 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts in Linguistic Studies. 
 
 
 
 
 
Syracuse University 
May 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                             ​                                   ​  
                                                                             ​  
 
                                                               ​                                   ​  
Copyright c© Deniz Satık 2018
All Rights Reserved
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 The Existence of PRO and Control Phenomena 3
2.1 Chapter Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2 Does PRO Exist? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.3 Control Phenomena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3.1 Obligatory control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3.2 Non-obligatory control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.3 Other kinds of control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4 Tough-predicates: raising or control? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.5 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3 Theories of Control 21
3.1 Chapter Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.2 Historical Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.3 Control is Raising . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.3.1 Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.4 Control is Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.5 Control as Predication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.6 Control as Agree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.7 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4 Deriving Obligatory Control from Syntax and Semantics 38
4.1 Chapter Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.2 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.3 Derivations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.3.1 Object control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
iv
4.3.2 Subject control across a DP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.3.3 Control shift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.3.4 Split control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.3.5 Partial control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.3.6 Backward control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.3.7 Copy control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.4 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5 Theoretical Consequences 63
5.1 Chapter Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.2 Predictions: Split-Partial Control and No Descending Condition . . . . . . . 63
5.3 Is Syntax Independent from Semantics? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.4 Non-Obligatory Control and Perceptual Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.5 Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.6 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
6 Conclusion 75
v
1
1 Introduction
Control theory is one of the most controversial areas of research in formal syntax and
semantics. Although (4) and (5) look identical on the surface, the two have a very differ-
ent derivation. While (4) involves Movement from the subject of embedded infinitival
of John to matrix subject, (5) involves no Movement; instead, the subject position of the
infinitival is filled with PRO.
(4) John seems [John to be happy].
(5) Johni tried [PROi to be happy].
The existence of PRO has been a mystery for syntacticians since the 1980s. According
to Chomsky (1981, 1986) and Manzini (1983), PRO is [+anaphoric], meaning it must al-
ways have an antecedent, and [+pronominal], because it can have an arbitrary reference.
If PRO’s meaning is determined by an antecedent, then it is controlled. Yet, the existence
of sentences such as the following seem to have no apparent controller of PRO, meaning
that it is likely not [+anaphoric].
(6) To eat apples is fun.
Although Lebeaux (1984), Epstein (1984) and Bhatt & Izvorski (1998) have attempted to
find an antecedent for all occurrences of PRO, Kawasaki (1993)’s example in (7) shows
that one cannot come up with an antecedent for all occurrences of PRO, given that the
antecedent that Bhatt, Epstein and Lebeaux have tried to argue is always the implicit
controller of PRO is clearly not controlling it.
(7) It is dangerous for babies [PROarb to smoke around them].
In addition, although PRO may be [+anaphoric], it need only be partially controlled.
This is shown in split control in (8), where PRO is partially controlled by each of two
controllers, and in (9) where PRO has an index that refers to more than its controller.
(8) Jacki promised Briank PROi+k to play games together.
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(9) Jacki tried PROi+ to meet at the zoo.
This, along with many other control phenomena, make a control theory that can account
for all of these facts difficult to come up with. But this is the goal of this thesis, in which
I attempt to derive all of control theory with the use of the operation Agree and lexical
semantics in the narrow syntax.
This thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, I present in more detail the vari-
ous facts that we see in control structures across languages. Chapter 3 presents each
approach to control that has attempted to account for some of these facts, and con-
cludes that none of them do so successfully. Chapter 4 presents the theory of control
as proposed by this thesis, with illustrative derivations. Chapter 5 mentions the conse-
quences and attempts to solve problems that arise with this approach to control. Chap-
ter 6 concludes; before concluding, I present the idea that PRO is a pronomial yet pseu-
doanaphor as derived by the mechanism proposed in this thesis, and its only difference
with little pro is its inability to receive Case.
3
2 The Existence of PRO and Control Phenomena
2.1 Chapter Overview
The primary concern in this chapter is to introduce the reader to empirical phenomena
involving control. Section 2.2 goes over the debate on whether PRO exists or not, by pre-
senting evidence from ellipsis, Case and complementizer contrasts between raising and
control constructions. Section 2.3 goes over some of the most challenging empirical facts
that have been noted regarding control, noting the importance of both syntax and lexical
semantics in determining the controller of PRO, in addition to providing more evidence
for the existence of PRO in the form of partial and split control.
Section 2.3.1 introduces the reader to the usual case of obligatory control, in which
the controller is always the same–something that is determined by the control predicate.
Section 2.3.2 presents the case of non-obligatory control, in which this need not be the
case. Section 2.3.3 points out other control facts that have not been very rigorously an-
alyzed: backward, adjunct and copy control. Section 2.4 gives strong evidence to think
tough-constructions involve control and not raising.
The intention is to introduce the reader to a very complicated paradigm before con-
sidering theoretical approaches that fall short of accounting for most of the facts. A
strong theory of control must include a synthesis of syntax and lexical semantics, rather
than a purely syntactic or semantic approach, as has been proposed in the literature.
2.2 Does PRO Exist?
Before looking at different views of control theory, it is important to first identify what
the empirical facts are. After all, the first and foremost goal of a successful theory of
control is to be able to derive different kinds of control, in addition to being able to pre-
dict currently undiscovered phenomena. Further, a successful theory of control must
be able to explain in what contexts we get control, when it is obligatory or not, and so
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on. Though important, this is an exceedingly difficult task. As the next chapter points
out, all current theories of control usually apply only to a subset of empirically observed
phenomena.
Let’s start with the basics. While (10) and (11) look alike, there is reason to believe
that they differ in their syntactic structure. In particular, raising constructions such as
(10) deal with Movement of the infinitival Spec,TP subject to matrix Spec,TP, while (11)
is a control construction, in which there is no Movement. Instead, there is a null subject,
the controllee, that has its syntactic index determined by a controller. In this case, the
controller would be the DP in matrix Spec,TP position.
(10) John seems [TP John to be happy].
(11) Johni tried [TP PROi to be happy].
This contrast has been motivated by the θ-Criterion of Chomsky (1981), which is defined
as follows:
(12) Each argument bears one and only one θ-role.
(13) Each θ-role is assigned to one and only one argument.
A θ-role is a thematic relation between a predicate and a noun phrase. The number, type
and position of each θ-role is in the verb’s lexical entry, and if a θ-role is not fulfilled,
this leads to ungrammaticality. In a simple example like John loves Jack, John is the Agent
of love and Jack is the Theme of love. A sentence such as John loves in which the intended
meaning is John loves himself is ungrammatical because John cannot receive the Theme
role, and thereby move into an Agent θ-role position, or Spec,vP.
It is easy to see that the matrix predicate of (10), seem, does not assign an external θ-
role to its subject, due to the possibility of a sentence such as (14), in which the expletive
it has no meaning. However, (15) shows that try must have a meaningful external argu-
ment, and therefore assign a θ-role to this argument, because you cannot insert the same
expletive.
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(14) It seems to be raining.
(15) *It tried to be raining.
It is now possible to explain the contrast between (10) and (11). In (11), the existence
of PRO is assumed, because if John moved up from the subject position of be happy, it
would receive two θ-roles, violating the θ-Criterion of Chomsky (1981), which says that
each argument can only receive one θ-role.
Would it be possible to remove this condition? According to Chomsky, we need the
θ-Criterion as stated so that (16) doesn’t mean (17), given that send seems to have an op-
tional θ-role, which is the receiver of the object being sent:
(16) Mary sent John.
(17) Mary sent John to himself.
However, the θ-Criterion itself is controversial: this approach states it as an indepen-
dent principle of syntax, but according to approaches such as Heim & Kratzer (1998),
it is possible to derive it with a system of formal semantics, making it superfluous. We
should then come up with a way to defend the existence of PRO that does not rely on
the θ-Criterion. And there are many reasons for believing that it does exist, indepen-
dently of this ad hoc syntactic criterion that should belong in semantics.
Landau (2013), with his examples in (20)-(21), shows that VP-ellipsis, which erases el-
ements below T in English, does the same in infinitival phrases, deleting everything be-
low to. This would be hard to explain if infinitival phrases were not clausal, all of which
have subjects.1
1This follows from the Extended Projection Principle of Chomsky (1982), which states that clauses
must contain a DP in subject position, which is Spec,TP in English. This explains the existence of
expletive-insertion, in which clauses can have a meaningless and seemingly unnecessary subject.
(18) *Is raining.
(19) It is raining.
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(20) She didn’t hope that Brian would recover soon, but we did hope that Brian would
recover soon.
(21) She didn’t hope to recover soon, but we hoped to recover soon.
Basic syntactic tests from Koster & May (1982) involving conjunction of infinitival
phrases and finite clauses work, meaning that infinitival phrases must also be clauses
of some kind, and hence have a subject.
(22) [[To write a novel] and [for the world to give it critical acclaim]] is John’s dream.
(23) [John expected to write a novel] but [that it would be a critical disaster].
Further, there is reason to believe that there is a syntactic object in the subject position of
an infinitival phrase in Icelandic that actually receives Case. Examples from Sigurðsson
(1991) show that PRO receives accusative Case with examples of floating quantifiers:
(24) Strákarniri
the.boys.NOM
vonast
hope
til
for
[aD
to
PROi
PRO.ACC
vanta
to.lack
ekki
not
alla
all.ACC
í
in
skólann]
the.school
’The boys hope not to be all absent from school.’
The floating quantifier alla agrees in Case with the local subject, PRO, and not the con-
troller, the boys. The presence of Case would be completely mysterious if there were not
a subject inside the infinitival phrase. Interestingly, there is no case mismatch in raising
constructions, which involve Movement rather than PRO. This gives more reason to be-
lieve in a raising/control contrast. The quirky case that is determined by the embedded
predicate shows up on the matrix subject:
(25) Strákana
the.boys.ACC
virDast
seem
[ti
t
vanta
to.lack
ekki
not
alla
all.ACC
í
in
skólann]
the.school
’The boys seem not to be all absent from school.’
Next, an analysis of Hebrew in (26)-(27) from Landau (2002) gives us very strong rea-
sons to believe that raising constructions are fundamentally different from control con-
structions, and hence that PRO exists.
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(26) Rinai
Rina
xadla
stopped
[(me-)
(from-)
PROi
PRO
le’acben
to.irritate
et
ACC
Gil].
Gil
’Rina stopped irritating Gil.’
(27) Ha-muzika
the-music
ha-ro’ešeti
the-noisy
xadla
stopped
[(*me-)
(*from-)
ti
ti
le’acben
to.irritate
et
ACC
Gil].
Gil
’The loud music stopped irritating Gil.’ Hebrew
me- is an infinitival complementizer associated with complements that have a negative
entailment, while the verb xadla is ambiguous between raising and control, and only an-
imate DPs can control. In (26), the subject is animate while it is not in (27). The most rea-
sonable assumption to make when presented with these data is that infinitival phrases
are clauses, and hence contain subjects: a complementizer, C0, is the head of a CP, which
necessarily marks an embedded clause as its complement. It would otherwise be myste-
rious as to how a complementizer can attach to a bare vP.
But Landau’s examples show more than just that raising and control infinitives are
clauses. It also provides evidence for a crosslinguistic distinction between control infini-
tives as CPs and raising infinitives as TPs. When there is an animate DP with the verb
xadla, there is control and an infinitival complementizer, whereas there is no comple-
mentizer with an inanimate DP. This contrast cannot be explained if raising and control
infinitives are both TPs, or both CPs; some kind of a distinction is therefore necessary.
2.3 Control Phenomena
The rest of this chapter continues to distinguish between obligatory control (OC) and
non-obligatory control (NOC), while presenting other kinds of control and commenting
on the status of tough-constructions in the raising or control debate.
It is important to define these two separate kinds of control as more evidence for the
existence of PRO belongs to a subset of obligatory control. In particular, partial and split
control both involve PRO which is only "partially" controlled by a controller. This makes
it difficult to argue that the subject of the infinitival doesn’t exist, or that it can be de-
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rived by Movement, given that they do exist, and cannot be derived by Internal Merge.
2.3.1 Obligatory control
Obligatory control represents the usual case of control; the controller is determined by
its position in the entire sentence and the control predicate that is in the sentence. PRO
must always be semantically interpreted as a bound variable of that controller. As we
will shortly see, both lexical semantics and syntax play a role in the kind of control that
is present in a given sentence.
This contrasts with free control, first pointed out by Postal (1970), and his example
is given in (28). PRO can be understood to refer to Harry, Bill or both at the same time,
which would be a case of split control. The case of obligatory control would only allow
one argument to be the controller.2
(28) Harry talked to Bill about PRO kissing Greta.
Obligatory control can be classified based on two dimensions, whether the controller is
the subject of the predicate or whether the controller is the object of the predicate. Sub-
ject and object control are represented respectively in (29) and (30).
(29) I tried/wanted/ran to help him. Subject control
(30) I persuaded/pressured/hit John to help her. Object control
The usual cases of control obey locality principles, such as Rizzi (1990)’s Relativized
Minimality Condition or Chomsky (1995)’s Last Resort. However, Rosenbaum (1967)
was the first to point out the famous counterexample to locality in control involving the
verb promise. Even when this verb has an object, the controller must always be the sub-
ject.
(31) Ii promised John [PROi to help him].
2But it can also have a PROarb interpretation in which it refers to people in general kissing Greta, which
is a completely sensible interpretation of the sentence.
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(32) *I promised Johni [PROi to help him].
The difference might be due to the lexical semantics of promise. Consider the contrast
between (33) and (34) from Culicover & Jackendoff (2001), which they argue differ only
in terms of lexical semantics and no difference whatsoever in syntax.
(33) John’s promise/vow/offer/guarantee/obligation/pledge/oath/commitment to
Susan to take care of himself/*herself
(34) John’s order/instructions/reminder/encouragement/invitation to Susan to take
care of *himself/herself
Supporting their prediction involving promise, the verb form of vow also involves sub-
ject control rather than object, which is illustrated in this example from Postal (1970).
(35) I vowed to Zeus to find the thief.
According to them, what seems to be in common with the nominals in (33) is that they
have a semantic role called Source, assigned to the giver of the promise. The presence
of the thematic relation Source can be associated with subject control, and the lack of
it can be associated with object control. But since thematic relations are not syntactic,
a syntactic approach cannot account for the paradigm just presented, and a semantic
approach should be preferred.
But promise is just one of few examples that challenge locality in control. Chomsky &
Halle (1968) points out that although beg is usually an object control verb, the passiviza-
tion of the embedded clause may allow beg to have subject control rather than object.3
(37) Johni begged Bill PROi to be shown the new book.
This is known as the phenomenon of control shift, and it happens in other control predi-
cates as well.
3The reason why Chomsky (1968)’s following sentence has subject control is not so clear.
(36) John gave me the impression of working on that problem.
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(38) Johnj persuaded Marym PROj to be allowed to take out the trash.
Control shift also happens with promise, and in that case it becomes an object control
predicate.4
(39) Johnj promised Marym PROm to be allowed to take out the trash.
With the basics of OC established, we can move on to consider lesser known OC phe-
nomena, which also happen to be evidence for the existence of PRO. One subset of OC is
partial control (PC), in which the index of PRO includes the controller, but refers to more
than just the controller. Landau (1999) was the first to provide a thorough analysis of
this phenomenon. The class that is not partial control he defines as exhaustive control.
This class requires strict identity between PRO and the controller, unlike partial control.
(40) *Johni managed [PROi+ to gather at 6].
(41) The chairi preferred [PROi+ to gather at 6].
(42) *The chairi began [PROi+ meeting without a concrete agenda].
(43) Billi regretted [PROi+ meeting without a concrete agenda].
Partial control being licensed depends on the control predicate in the sentence, and Lan-
dau (1999) notes that this property is semantic tense, at least in English, putting further
importance on the role of semantics in control. Predicates with semantic tense include
factives (glad, sad, regret), propositionals (think, believe), desideratives (want, yearn)
and interrogatives (wonder, ask, find out). Untensed predicates include implicatives
(manage, bother, make sure), which is a very broad category, aspectuals (begin, finish),
modals (could, must) and evaluative adjectives (crazy, stupid). PC complements are al-
ways tensed on one hand, while exhaustive control complements are untensed.
While partial control involves a reference greater than its controller, split control in-
volves two controllers, and its reference is no more than both controllers at the same
4While multiple solutions for control shift have been proposed in the literature, this thesis will take for
granted the approach developed by Farkas (1988), and a summary of it will be presented in section 4.2.
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time. Based on the following example, Hornstein (1999) argues that split control is a case
of NOC, because OC PRO cannot have split antecedents.
(44) *Johni told Maryj [PROi+j to wash themselves/each other].
This ignores multiple other examples in English in which split control is licit. This is
simply a problem with the verb told rather than the status of split control in English,
however. Landau (1999) gives multiple pieces of evidence showing the existence of split
control in English, while Landau (2013) points out that it is usually found with verbs of
proposal and communication.
(45) Johni proposed to Maryj [PROi+j to meet each other at 6].
(46) Johni asked Maryj [whether PROi+j to get themselves a new car].
(47) Johni discussed with Maryj [which club PROi+j to become members of].
We will see next chapter that the problem of split control has been unsolved by all theo-
ries of control to date, and some (e.g. Lebeaux (1984)) as a result have tried to argue that
split control is not a unique phenomenon; it is just partial control.
Partial and split control both provide evidence for the existence of PRO. Suppose that
PRO did not exist; the existence of these kinds of control would then be completely mys-
terious. If we took a "control is raising" approach akin to Hornstein (1999), this would
completely fail to derive either phenomena since Copy + Merge cannot create syntactic
objects with different indexes.
2.3.2 Non-obligatory control
On the other hand, in non-obligatory control, or NOC, PRO need not be interpreted as a
bound variable. It can refer to a contextually salient individual or to people in general.
Although it can be interpreted that way, there are cases in which we do see examples
like split control in NOC contexts.
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Cases of NOC often involve the notorious PROarb, a kind of uncontrolled PRO which
does not refer to any DP in the matrix sentence, but rather to contextually salient people
in general. This is problematic, since Chomsky (1981, 1986) and Manzini (1983)’s treat-
ment of PRO assume that PRO’s referent is necessarily determined by an antecedent; it
cannot exist without this antecedent.
But before going into this, examples are given in (48)-(49), along with their features,
both noted by Hornstein (1999).
(48) It was believed that [PRO shaving was important]. Classical NOC
(49) Johni thinks that it is believed that [PROi shaving himself is important]. Non-local
antecedent
(50) Clinton’si campaign believes that [PROi keeping his sex life under control] is nec-
essary for electoral success. Non-c-commanding
(51) Johni told Maryj [that [[PROi+j washing themselves/each other] would be fun]].
Split NOC
Interestingly, NOC PRO must necessarily be [+human]. Chomsky (1981) was the first to
note the contrast in (52)-(55), which contain PROarb, making them a clear case of NOC.
It is impossible to imagine PRO as being [−human] in these examples. (55) isn’t inter-
preted as rocks rolling down the hill; PRO must be [+human].
(52) For it to snow all day would prevent me from going to school.
(53) *To snow all day would prevent me from going to school.
(54) It is possible for rocks to roll down the hill.
(55) It is possible to roll down the hill.
A subset of NOC is arbitrary control, are simply those in which PROarb exists. They re-
fer to people in general. A classic example of this phenomenon might be the following
Shakespearean sentence.
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(56) To be or not to be - that is the question.
For these examples (57)-(60) from Bhatt & Izvorski (1998), it is difficult to find a syntactic
object that controls PRO, which is why they are considered to be examples of NOC.
(57) PROarb to write haiku is fun.
(58) It is difficult PROarb to dance the tango.
(59) PROarb writing haiku is fun.
(60) PROarb dancing the tango is difficult.
Lebeaux (1984), Epstein (1984) and Bhatt & Izvorski (1998) attempt to find an antecedent
for such occurrences of PRO. That is, they want to get rid of uncontrolled PROarb com-
pletely. In all of these constructions, we see that the experiencer, which is in the imme-
diately higher clause inside the specifier of the lexical adjective head, is implicit and
generic5, and PROarb is allowed here, in agreement with their hypothesis. So the next
set of sentences should not allow PROarb:
(62) PROi to write haiku is fun for Gerhardti.
(63) It is difficult for Isabellai PROi to dance the tango.
(64) PROi writing haiku is fun for Gerhardti.
(65) PROi dancing the tango is difficult for Isabellai.
The problem for Bhatt & Izvorski (1998) is that the above data is not very convincing;
it is in fact possible to come up with a PROarb interpretation in sentences with tough-
predicates, which is the kind of predicate found in (63)-(66). That is, it is simply the case
that this data is not comprehensive enough.
5They follow Berman & Szamosi (1972) and Epstein (1984) in assuming that each of these predicates
necessarily have an experiencer, and agree with Pesetsky (1987)’s assertion that this embedded TP is sim-
ply phonologically deleted in sentences without infinitivals like below:
(61) This exam is easy/hard/fun/dangerous/stupid.
. Otherwise, Bhatt & Izvorski (1998)’s argument would not work, as if experiencers are not always avail-
able then PROarb may still exist.
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Brody (1993) and Kawasaki (1993) both are the first to point out the possibility of
PROarb in tough-constructions. Brody himself arrives at this result with a Principle B vio-
lation6; his examples are given in (66)-(67).
(66) *PRO to teach themi math is easy for the childreni.
(67) PRO to teach themi math is useful for the childreni
Suppose PRO also had index i if the children did indeed control PRO. We would have a
Principle B violation. But the next sentence is grammatical. This distinction, as Brody
points out, seems to be purely due to lexical differences.
Kawasaki (1993) also provides an example of a genuinely unrestricted PROarb, in
which the experiencer refers to something other than the arbitrary interpretation of
PRO.
(68) It is dangerous for babies [PROarb to smoke around them].
It would be useful to be able to come up with an account of the purely lexical differences
that Brody notes; the approach of Bhatt & Izvorski (1998) still works with the example
of easy, because regardless of whatever context one can pair with the predicate on the
easiness scale, one can’t get a PROarb interpretation. I believe that one might be to distin-
guish between tough-predicates on the easiness scale, and those which are not.
My own examples in (69)-(72) show the contrast between these classes. The first ex-
ample is meant to represent any adjective that is not on the easiness scale, and how it
might be possible to conceive of a scenario in which the sentence would be grammati-
cal.7 The second example is meant to show that regardless of context, you cannot get a
PROarb interpretation from an adjective on the easiness scale.8
6This is the condition of binding theory that pronouns must be free, or not bound, in their binding
domain. In this case, the pronoun is them, which moves up along with the entire infinitival clause to the
matrix subject position.
7Given that the sentences involve children and smoking in some contextually salient room, imagine
the following context. Suppose that it is dangerous for children for people in general to smoke in the same
room as those children. In that case, the sentence It is dangerous for the children to smoke in the room seems
grammatical.
8Trying to come up with a context for this sentence is not as straightforward as the previous example.
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(69) It is dangerous/fun/interesting/delightful/awesome for the children [PROarb to
smoke in the room].
(70) *It is hard/easy/difficult/impossible/possible for the children [PROarb to smoke
in the room].
However, the possible PROarb interpretation disappears if we make the overt experi-
encer implicit. Doing so is a completely syntactic change and has nothing to do with
lexical semantics. In that case, PROarb must have the same interpretation as the implicit
experiencer. It is not possible to imagine, for example, the experiencer referring to chil-
dren and PRO referring to people in general.
(71) It is dangerous/fun/interesting/delightful/awesome to smoke in the room.
(72) It is hard/easy/difficult/impossible/possible to smoke in the room.
What all of these examples concerning PROarb is meant to show is that both lexical se-
mantics and syntax can play a role in control. A good theory of control must be able to
accommodate these two factors; many views that will be considered in the next chapter
focus on only the syntactic or semantic aspect of control and fail to account for an entire
kind of phenomena involving syntax or semantics.
2.3.3 Other kinds of control
A subset of control is adjunct control, where the infinitival that contains PRO is inside
an adjunct.9 The PRO that is inside the adjunct is hence controlled from outside the ad-
junct. The usual case of control inside adjuncts is obligatory, which is seen in examples
(73)-(75).
Suppose that the children would have to undergo some difficulty as a result of the adults smoking in the
room. Maybe they would have to spend all day cleaning up cigarette smoke. Even in a context like this
the sentence It is hard for the children to smoke in the room is not grammatical.
9This has implications on what kind of a theory of control we are limited to. This will be discussed in
future chapters in detail, but this means that no syntactic operations can take place from outside to in-
side an adjunct, which is an island, impenetrable to all syntactic operations. A syntactic theory of control
has to come up with a way for syntactic operations to take place at the edge of the island, which might
involve the movement of PRO to Spec,CP.
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(73) He called us before looking around. Temporal clause
(74) He ate at Chipotle to fill his stomach. Goal clause
(75) He stopped to think what a fool he had been. Stimulus clause
However, adjunct control need not be limited to OC. Williams (1992) gives the example
(76), where the sentence has a NOC adjunct that is [−human], leading to ungrammat-
icality. My own example in (77) shows that the grammaticality of this sentence can be
fixed if PRO is made [+human].
(76) *The open windowi proves that [before PROi breaking], it was raining.
(77) The open window proves that [before PROi jumping], hei was happy.
Kawasaki (1993) provides more examples of NOC adjuncts in (78)-(80), in which PRO is
forced to have a pragmatically odd [+human] reading because they are necessarily cases
of NOC. (80) is perhaps less pragmatically odd than the (78) and (79).
(78) [After PROarb being spoiled in a fridge], there is nothing even a good cook can
do.
(79) The government abolished [PROarb having to be surrounded by fences].
(80) I read stories about [PROarb falling off a cliff].
Another phenomenon within obligatory control is noted by Polinsky & Potsdam (2002),
in which an overt DP is controlled, rather than the usual case of being the controller, and
the controller position is empty. This is called backward control.10 In Tsez, this can only
happen with certain verbs, such as the aspectual verbs begin, stop and continue. Forward
control is excluded from these kinds of verbs.
(81) ∆i
II.ABS
[kid-bai
girl.II-ERG
ziya
cow.III.ABS
b-išra]
III-feed.INF
y-oq-si.
II-begin-PAST.EVID
’The girl began to feed the cow.’ Tsez
10The idea that backward control exists is not unique to Tsez. Other languages, such as Portuguese ac-
cording to Farrell (1995) and Japanese in Fujii (2006), have been argued to have backward control as well.
However, these cases are not anywhere near as uncontroversial.
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The embedded verb feed, bears the agreement marker of its absolutive argument cow.
But surprisingly, even though Tsez is a language in which verbs do not agree with non-
absolutive arguments, the matrix verb bears the agreement marker of the ergative sub-
ject girl. According to Polinsky & Potsdam (2002), this means that either there is an ex-
ceptional agreement here, which would be ad hoc, or there is an unpronounced, syntactic
and semantically significant subject. The ergative agreement marker arises as a result of
agreement with the silent absolutive subject.
Finally, in some languages, the controlled position is spelled out, so that an overt DP
is again controlled, but instead of an empty controller as in backward control, there is a
copy. Lee (2003) presents (82) as a case of copy control. Landau (2013) notes that both of
these backward and copy control pass the test for being kinds of OC control.
(82) R-càà’z
HAB-want
Lia
FEM
Paamm
Pam
[g-ahcnèe
IRR-help
Lia
FEM
Paamm
Pam
Gye’eihly].
Mike
’Pam wants to help Mike.’ San Lucas Quiavini Zapotec
2.4 Tough-predicates: raising or control?
An assumption that will be made throughout this thesis is the idea is that tough-
predicates are control predicates; that is, whenever we see a tough-predicate with an
infinitival, it will contain a PRO and not involve Movement. This conclusion will be fur-
ther argued for in this section, which shows that tough-predicates involve CP infinitives
and not TP infinitives, hence involving control, which was concluded in 2.2.
A tough-predicate is one in which the matrix subject is the object of the embedded
verb in the infinitival. As seen in (83)-(86), one could also insert an expletive into matrix
subject position rather than the object of the embedded verb.
(83) It is fun/annoying/entertaining/torture to play The Legend of Zelda.
(84) The Legend of Zelda is fun/annoying/entertaining/torture to play t.
(85) It is easy/hard/possible/impossible to get As in linguistics courses.
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(86) Linguistics courses are easy/hard/possible/impossible to get As in t.
A reason to believe that tough-predicates are raising predicates is because they do not
seem to assign θ-roles to their subject, because they allow the expletive constructions as
seen above, in which the expletives are meaningless. By definition, if raising predicates
are those which do not assign an external θ-role, then tough-predicates must be raising
predicates. They also pass the idiom test for raising predicates, as seen in (87).
(87) It is easy to kick the bucket.
But we need not limit ourselves to such a narrow definition of raising in which raising
predicates are only those which do not assign an external θ-role. They can also be those
which assign an experiencer θ-role, and the experiencer may control PRO. The original
argument for the existence of PRO was, after all, based on the flawed θ-Criterion. In a
sentence as follows, John receives an experiencer θ-role from easy.
(88) It is easy for John to kick the bucket.
Pesetsky (1987) notes in the reproduced examples (89)-(90) and (91)-(92) the following
contrast. Verbs with experiencer θ-roles have obligatory control between the experiencer
and PRO when tough-movement applies, which can occur together with control.
(89) These storiesj pleased mei [PROi to listen to tj].
(90) Warj frightens mei [PROi to think about tj].
Meanwhile, tough-movement across verbs that do not have experiencers fail.
(91) *Maryj sued Suei [PROi to prove a point to tj].
(92) *Billj kicked mei [PROi to have a look at tj].
All tough-adjectives seem to have experiencers available, which seems to indicate the
availability of PRO when an experiencer θ-role is assigned. Based on the original argu-
ments involving the θ-Criterion, since raising would involve the experiencer receiving
two θ-roles, this is evidence for the existence of PRO.
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Another reason, unrelated to the θ-Criterion, to believe that tough-predicates involve
control is due to illicit wh-movement with tough-movement at the same time. For the
purposes of this thesis I assume that Chomsky (1977)’s analysis of these constructions
involving wh-movement is correct.11 According to Chomsky, tough-constructions involve
the movement of a null operator, the object of the embedded verb, to Spec,CP position,
after which the matrix subject is Merged to matrix Spec,TP.
As noted earlier, control infinitives are likely made of CPs and not TPs. Chomsky pro-
vides further evidence of this by providing evidence of wh-movement, in which com-
bining both tough- and wh- movement is ungrammatical. This indicates that embedded
Spec,CP is already filled, so these facts would be mysterious if control infinitives were
not CPs.
(93) It is easy to play these sonatas on this violin.
(94) This violin is easy to play these sonatas on.
(95) *What sonatasi is this violinj easy to play ti on tj?
11Tough-constructions are by no means a solved problem in syntax, there are many alternate views in
the literature. However, a successful account of tough-movement must also include some kind of wh-
movement. Another account of tough-constructions that does so is Hicks (2009). For Hicks, the object of
the embedded verb is a complex null operator, first conceived by Hornstein (2001) and Collins (2005a,b),
containing the matrix subject. This moves to embedded Spec,CP, and because the Case of the larger null
operator is checked but the Case of the matrix subject inside it is not checked, the subject moves to matrix
Spec,TP.
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2.5 Concluding Remarks
The idea behind this chapter was to present some data in preparation for the detailed
analysis of the success of all the current theories of control. As I intend to show, al-
though some theories succeed in accounting for some of the most interesting syntactic
and semantic facts we have seen throughout this chapter, views of control tend to ignore
one aspect of control while focusing on the other. There is, for example, extensive evi-
dence that control is different from raising, and trying to be as theoretically minimalist
as possible will simply lead to an ignorance of the empirical facts in natural language.
Control is a diverse phenomenon in which syntax and semantics may both play a role
in the kinds of control that we see, ranging from subject to object control and the dif-
ferent kinds of obligatory and non-obligatory control. Any successful theory of control
must be able to account for these empirical phenomena.
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3 Theories of Control
3.1 Chapter Overview
The goal of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the different approaches to con-
trol. Section 2 goes over the historical Equi-NP deletion approach, while also giving the
generic control treatment that would be taught in an introduction to syntax course.
Section 3, 4, 5 and 6 go over the more advanced theories of control, all of which have
defenders today. Section 3 considers perhaps the most popular control as raising. The
conclusion is that control as raising is the most empirically and theoretically inadequate
approach to control. Section 4 and 5 go over the control as binding and control as pred-
ication approaches, respectively, concluding that both approaches suffer from a one-
dimensional explanation of the facts.
Section 6 covers Landau (1999)’s control as Agree approach, which is the most ex-
planatory approach to control to date. While giving importance to both syntax and se-
mantics, Landau does so at the cost of being unable to account for kinds of control such
as split, backward, copy and adjunct control. A strong theory of control has to be able to
provide a very general approach, while giving importance to both syntax and semantics.
3.2 Historical Approaches
As we saw in the previous chapter, control is complicated: among other things, PRO
need not refer to only the controller, PRO may itself be the controller, and the position
of the controller may vary depending on semantics. More generally speaking, the con-
troller(s) of PRO may vary depending on both syntax and semantics. A strong theory of
control, then, ought to be a theory incorporating elements of both syntax and semantics,
and not a one-dimensional approach.
To gain a general understanding of how theories of control have evolved since con-
trol was first discovered, it is important to look back. The very first theory of control
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was developed in Rosenbaum (1967). While we no longer have the distinction between
Deep- and Surface-Structure, which was first developed in Chomsky (1965), this theory
was based on that distinction. For Rosenbaum, a sentence with control such as (96) is
derived from (97) in Deep-Structure via deletion.
(96) John preferred to eat at Chipotle.
(97) John preferred John to eat at Chipotle.
Presumably, this deletion must take place under identity. Otherwise, we could derive a
reading of (96) which meant, for example, that John preferred for someone else to eat at
Chipotle. This theory is known as Equi-NP deletion.
The similarities between this view as presented in the past and our current concep-
tion of raising are obvious. Following Chomsky (1995), we have eliminated D- and S-
Structure in favor of a syntactic structure that is built from bottom-up gradually. Instead
of Movement rules, we have Internal Merge, which is an application of Copy followed
by an application of Merge to the root of the tree. Copies are syntactic objects that are
recreated to be used again. This process then results in the deletion of the lower Copy.
Nunes (1995) gives a more modern conception of deletion, which takes place under a
framework with the operation Copy, which as its name would imply, creates a copy of a
syntactic object. Deletion of Copies is only permitted by the operation Chain Reduction,
which takes place inside the chain, and chains are established via c-command.
Therefore, when we derive a sentence with raising such as John seems to be eating, this
also involves a structure of the form John seems John to be eating, and deletion of a lower
copy under identity. Though it was not at the time, it is possible to draw analogies be-
tween control as Equi-NP deletion and today’s version of control as raising. Both ap-
proaches rely on some kind of deletion. Any counterargument against this old view
would also apply to more modern accounts of control as raising.
The usual approach to control that is taught in introductory syntax books such as
Carnie (2013) involves the DP PRO. It is a DP that appears in embedded Spec,TP posi-
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tion that shares its index with a c-commanding DP. It is taught that there are three dif-
ferent kinds of DPs: pronouns, anaphors and R-expressions. Anaphors must be bound
in their binding domain; pronouns must be free in theirs and R-expressions must be free
regardless. PRO is a DP which has a completely mysterious existence.
To be more abstract, according to Chomsky (1981, 1986) and Manzini (1983), PRO is
both [+anaphoric] (that is, it must always have an antecedent) and [+pronominal] (be-
cause it can have an arbitrary reference). This is by definition contradictory. How can
it appear uncontrolled if it must, by definition, be controlled? But the arguments for its
existence seem to be unquestionable, as we went over in Chapter 2. So any account of
control must involve PRO.12
Defining PRO in terms of binding theory doesn’t seem to work, then. So researchers
have tried to propose that PRO is separate from binding altogether; it has to be ac-
counted for by a separate control theory. And as we saw in Chapter 2, control is a phe-
nomenon in which syntax and lexical semantics may both play an important role. Text-
books such as Carnie (2013) make similar claims and leave the question of what ap-
proach to control is correct unanswered. As we will see in this chapter, there is no cur-
rent approach that can derive most important control phenomena.
3.3 Control is Raising
Perhaps the most well-known theory of control in the minimalist tradition is provided
in Hornstein (1999). Part of the reason for its popularity is due to its apparent simplic-
ity and attempt to eliminate theoretically undesirable portions of syntax. Though this
approach purports to be minimalist, the elimination of PRO actually leads to more ques-
tions than answers, and risks becoming far more complex than it would have been with
PRO. Due to its popularity, this is the primary theory of control that will be discussed in
this chapter.
12The nature of PRO will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.
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Hornstein (1999) argues that control is Movement and hence, no different than rais-
ing. Hornstein reconsiders the original reason for the existence of PRO, which is the
θ-Criterion. The previous chapter discussed in detail why we need some form of θ-
Criterion, in which each DP can receive only one θ-role. This is to avoid (98) having the
same meaning as (99).
(98) Mary sent John.
(99) Mary sent John to himself.
But by changing a part of the θ-Criterion which says that Each argument must receive ex-
actly one θ-role to Each argument must receive at least one θ-role, we could make the struc-
tures of these two sentences look very similar, apart from the θ-roles assigned, and get
rid of PRO.
The existence of PRO is a troubled one. Since Chomsky (1981, 1986) and Manzini
(1983)’s treatment of PRO in which its referent is determined by an antecedent, it has
been a goal of syntactic analysis to find an antecedent for occurrences of PRO which do
not seem to be controlled. But these attempts have failed, as noted in Chapter 2. Gen-
uine cases of PROarb do exist.
(100) It is dangerous for babies [PROarb to smoke around them].
Given that PRO is a dubious theoretical construct, it would of course be theoretically
preferable to eliminate PRO entirely from our theory of grammar. Therefore, Hornstein’s
intentions are certainly well-founded.
θ-theory itself is reduced to Agreement, in which receiving a θ-role is merely to check
the thematic feature of a predicate. Hornstein wants Movement to a θ-position to obey
requirements on locality, and to conform to syntactic requirements like Greed, which
says that a syntactic object A only enters a syntactic operation to satisfy features of itself.
Another desirable result is that the controller must c-command the controllee, since
Movement targets c-commanding landing sites, due to the aforementioned process
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of Chain Reduction. A simple sentence sentence with control is derived exactly as we
would expect, by raising.
(101) John tried John to eat an apple.
The only difference with raising structures is that John also checks the external θ-role of
the verb tried, meaning it has two θ-roles.
The strength of Hornstein’s approach is in the concept rather than the execution. Us-
ing newly-made minimalist tools to eliminate the incredibly troubled existence of PRO
and make the derivation of control barely any different from raising, Hornstein is in-
deed able to simplify, at least at first glance, a very complicated phenomenon. As the
minimalist approach of Chomsky (1995) exists almost entirely to avoid objections based
on Occam’s razor, this attempt is well-founded in theory.
3.3.1 Problems
The problems for Hornstein begin, however, when we look at almost any empirical fact
that differs from the usual textbook distinction of control vs. raising. For contexts with
optional control, he posits the existence of a little pro, found in languages like Turkish
and Italian to explain the existence of sentences with no overt subjects.
(102) It is dangerous for babies [pro to smoke around them].
(103) Git-ti-m.
Go.PST.1SG
’I went.’ Turkish
There are a few problems with this proposal. First, pro is supposed to get Case in all
other contexts in which it appears. In Turkish and in Italian and other languages in
which it appears, it is in matrix Spec,TP position and receives nominative Case.13 But
embedded infinitival Spec,TP is a well known position in which no Case is assigned.
13Jaklin Kornfilt (p.c.) points out that pro can receive genitive case in the subject position of a nominal-
ized embedded clause.
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How is it receiving Case? If we assume that embedded Spec,TP can be assigned nomina-
tive Case, then we would have to assume that in control sentences, John checks nomina-
tive Case twice.
Second, Hornstein will have to come up with an explanation for why pro can be in
nonfinite clauses without Case but nowhere else in English, and why it can only be in fi-
nite clauses with Case in other languages. In other words, why can’t we say the sentence
below in English:
(104) *Went. (Meaning I went, you went or someone went).
Moving to other issues, Landau (2013) cites multiple cases in (105)-(109) in which Horn-
stein’s view overgenerates. First consider passivization of the embedded subject. The
first two sentences are both good after passivization, but when hate is passivized, it’s un-
grammatical.
(105) I believe John to live like that.
(106) John was believed to live like that.
(107) *John was hated to live like that.
Again, nothing in the control as Movement theory tells us why it’s unacceptable. It’s
because of the different properties of the verb, and the control as Movement view cannot
distinguish between the different properties of verbs and predicates.
Next, consider implicit control. Nothing blocks the Movement of John from the sub-
ject of return later to the embedded Spec,TP position, to the object position of said, to the
subject position of said, and finally to the matrix Spec,TP position.
(108) John said to return later. (good if John said to someone else, to return later, so it
controls PRO)
(109) *John said to return later. (if the meaning is John said to himself to return later)
What seems to be wrong about (109) is the number of θ-roles John receives: it receives
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three, and that makes the sentence confusing and awkward to read. This might be taken
to be evidence in favor of the θ-Criterion that Hornstein rejects.14
Landau (2013) also notes cases of undergeneration, which involve partial and split
control. Hornstein makes no attempt to derive partial control as seen below:
(112) Hei wanted PROi+ to play games together.
There is no way to derive He in Spec,TP position from an embedded Spec,TP DP with
the index i+k by using Copy and Merge. Also consider cases of split control:
(113) Johni promised Maryk PROi+k to get married to each other.
Again, it is not clear how this sentence would be derived by applications of Copy and
Merge. The account also cannot derive control involving wh-objects, in which the subject
of the infinitival cannot be interpreted as a question-word.
(114) Who wants [who to leave]?
As mentioned previously in Chapter 2, Sigurðsson (1991) shows that PRO does actually
receive Case in Icelandic control with examples of floating quantifiers, but not in raising.
Movement would result in Case mismatch.
(115) Strákarniri
the.boys.NOM
vonast
hope
til
for
[aD
to
PROi
PRO.ACC
vanta
to.lack
ekki
not
alla
all.ACC
í
in
skólann]
the.school
’The boys hope not to be all absent from school.’
(116) Strákana
the.boys.ACC
virDast
seem
[ti
t
vanta
to.lack
ekki
not
alla
all.ACC
í
in
skólann]
the.school
’The boys hope not to be all absent from school.
14In favor of eliminating the Criterion that is not related to minimalist reasons, Hornstein gives the fol-
lowing example of a sentence which is derived by Movement of a DP from one θ-position to another. The
DP receives both the external and internal θ-roles of wash.
(110) Mary washed.
This conclusion might overgenerate, given that some verbs that involve movement like this and two
θ-roles are ungrammatical.
(111) *Mary ate. (meaning Mary ate herself)
Admittedly, the judgment here is not so clear. This may be due to pragmatic reasons involving the gross-
ness of cannibalism rather than a principled syntactic reason on its ungrammaticality.
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Also mentioned in the previous chapter, Landau gives us strong reason to believe that
because languages like Hebrew allow complementizers to attach to control infinitives
but not raising infinitives, all control infinitives are actually CPs rather than TPs, which
this approach cannot account for.
(117) Rinai
Rina
xadla
stopped
[(me-)
(from-)
PROi
PRO
le’acben
to.irritate
et
ACC
Gil].
Gil
’Rina stopped irritating Gil.’
(118) Ha-muzika
the-music
ha-ro’ešeti
the-noisy
xadla
stopped
[(*me-)
(*from-)
ti
ti
le’acben
to.irritate
et
ACC
Gil].
Gil
’The loud music stopped irritating Gil.’ Hebrew
In addition, Chomsky’s aforementioned approach to tough-constructions as involving
embedded CPs precludes the idea that control infinitives are mere TPs.
(119) It is easy to play these sonatas on this violin.
(120) This violin is easy to play these sonatas on.
(121) *What sonatasi is this violinj easy to play ti on tj?
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Hornstein’s account of control as raising is com-
pletely one-sided, in that it claims that control is purely a syntactic phenomena. This is
clearly not the case. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Culicover & Jackendoff’s rea-
son why promise involves subject control is due to the semantic role of Source.
(122) John’s promise/vow/offer/guarantee/obligation/pledge/oath/commitment to
Susan to take care of himself/*herself
(123) John’s order/instructions/reminder/encouragement/invitation to Susan to take
care of *himself/herself
Further, deriving the existence of a sentence like John promised Mary to go to Chipotle in-
volves a violation of some version of the Minimal Distance Principle, which says, to be
very broad, that syntactic operations must take place with the nearest syntactic object.
Movement cannot go past the c-commanding Mary.
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As mentioned before, Landau (1999) notes that the property involved in whether par-
tial control is licensed or not is semantic tense, which Hornstein’s one-sided view cannot
account for.
(124) *Johni managed [PROi+ to gather at 6].
(125) The chairi preferred [PROi+ to gather at 6].
Finally, this approach fails to account for the difference in control between adjectives on
the easiness scale and those which are not, which is a semantic fact rather than a syntac-
tic fact. The sentences below are syntactically identical, but there is a contrast.
(126) It is dangerous/fun/interesting/delightful/awesome for the children [PROarb to
smoke in the room].
(127) *It is hard/easy/difficult/impossible/possible for the children [PROarb to smoke
in the room].
Hornstein tries to remove a dubious and confusing theoretical construct in syntax, and
his philosophy is on the right track. We definitely do want to remove unnecessary and
questionable aspects of our syntactic theory as much as possible. However, the evidence
for the existence of PRO is too strong, since reducing control to Movement leads to nu-
merous devastating problems.
3.4 Control is Binding
Conceiving control as binding is an attempt to simplify phenomena that may, at first
glance, seem similar to general cases of binding. But rather than reducing control to rais-
ing, this approach attempts to reduce control to binding.
As previously noted, researchers such as Manzini and Chomsky have attempted to
define PRO in terms of [anaphoric] and [pronomial] features, both of which were used
to build binding theory. An anaphor would be [+anaphoric, −pronomial], because it
must be bound in its domain. A pronoun would be [−anaphoric, +pronomial], because
30
it must be free inside its domain. Finally, an R-expression (any other noun phrase such
as a proper name) must be [−anaphoric, −pronomial], meaning it must be free, pe-
riod. One then might predict the existence of PRO, which seems to be both [+anaphoric,
+pronomial], but that is self-contradictory. As we will see, solutions to this problem in-
volve defining contexts where PRO may not be controlled.
Generally speaking, according to the control as binding approach, PRO, at least in
OC contexts, is a null anaphor that is bound to its controller. As Landau (2013) points
out, the binding domain for PRO must then be different from that of an overt anaphor,
because it extends from an embedded to a matrix clause, as seen in his examples below
in (128)-(129).
(128) Johni hoped [PROi to impress his roommates].
(129) *Johni hoped [that himselfi would impress his roommates].
For Manzini (1983), this distinction is derived by assuming that an anaphor that does
not have a governing category must be bound in the category which has an accessible
subject, or its c-domain. This is called its domain-governing category.
For Manzini, the distinction between OC and NOC PRO is due to differences in their
binding domains. OC PRO must have a controller in the matrix clause, so their binding
domain extends to that. However, NOC PRO does not have a binding domain at all, and
according to her, is then exempt from Condition A of binding theory.
Lebeaux (1984) instead attempts to assume that null and overt anaphors have dif-
ferent binding domains by definition. Overt anaphors have the same binding domain
as normally assumed, but null anaphors are bound in the minimal TP containing the c-
domain (minimal maximal projection which has the anaphor) and its governor. The idea
that merely the phonological content of a syntactic object can change the size of its bind-
ing domain may seem like a troubling and ad hoc conclusion.
The third and final approach to control as binding to be considered in this chapter is
that of Koster (1984), which looks at some data in Dutch, given below in (130)-(131). For
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Koster, an ungoverned PRO is a pronoun, leading to NOC, and an OC complement is a
TP rather than a CP.
In Dutch, which is an SOV language, the verb proberen, meaning try, can optionally
select a complementizer -om. This makes an expletive-construction involving the con-
trol predicate try grammatical in Dutch, as seen in (130). Complements to the right of
the verb may have complementizers. But complements to the left of the verb never do,
making (131) ungrammatical, because it cannot accept an optional complementizer.
(130) Er
there
werd
was
ti
ti
geprobeerd
tried
[(om)
COMP
PRO
PRO
Bill
Bill
te
to
bezoeken]i
visit
’It was tried to visit Bill.’
(131) Er
there
werd
was
[PRO
PRO
Bill
Bill
ti]
ti
geprobeerd
tried
te
to
bezoekeni
visit
’It was tried to visit Bill.’
Due to this paradigm, Koster argues that (130) involves NOC, and it cannot be governed
because it is inside a CP, and it therefore does not need to be bound. (131) is an instance
of OC. There are contexts in Dutch in which OC is grammatical, as seen in Koster’s ex-
ample (132). This infinitive is OC because it can be governed; a complementizer is un-
grammatical in the sentence below because it is a TP.
(132) Zij
she
had
had
[(*om)
(*COMP)
PRO
PRO
het
the
boek
book
ti]
ti
probeerde
tried
te
to
lezeni
read
’She tried to read the book.’
Similarly to the control as Movement approach, the binding approach also suffers from
the same issues of only accounting for syntactic phenomena in control. Lasnik (1992)
points out that in obligatory control, the verb is what determines the argument that is
the controller, while binding cannot be determined by thematic restrictions. Though
Manzini (1983) admits that controller choice is sensitive to semantics, if control is bind-
ing and binding isn’t supposed to be influenced by semantics, then the contrast below is
left unexplained.
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(133) Johni told Maryj about himselfi/herselfj.
(134) Johni told Maryj [PROi/*j to leave].
Landau (2013) also argues that binding and control must be separate phenomena, given
that binding does not allow split antecedents while control does.
(135) *Johni showed Maryj to themselvesi+j.
(136) Johni proposed to Maryj [PROi+j to buy themselvesi+j a new car].
Finally, he points out that implicit arguments can control but not bind.
(137) Maryi thought that Johnj said (to heri) [PROi to wash herself].
(138) Maryi thought that Johnj talked *(to heri) about herselfi.
Similarly to the raising approach, the binding as control approach has good intentions,
in attempting to simplify the overly complicated problem that is control. However, the
empirical facts make it clear that control and binding may be separate facts entirely. I re-
visit this conclusion in Chapter 5. Seeing control as binding may be more palatable once
we point out that control as binding approaches have all been developed in the 1980s,
and we have had new theoretical tools developed since then. In particular, one could
imagine binding theory in terms of Agree. Though I leave this question open, some syn-
thesis between control as Agree and control as binding (if binding is construed as Agree)
may be possible.
3.5 Control as Predication
The predicational approach to control was originally developed as the "formal seman-
tics" approach. For Chierchia (1984), a sentence such as John tried to eat at Chipotle means
something like "in all possible worlds where John attempted to try to do something, he
had the property of eating at Chipotle." In this approach, what is being "controlled" is
not PRO per se, rather it is the entire embedded infinitival which PRO is supposed to be
in. Further, the infinitival is assumed to be a VP without PRO.
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Chierchia believes that control is associated with certain verbs, and it arises as a lex-
ical entailment. Each infinitival, VP, is a one-place functions that is mapped to con-
trollers. In the case of non-obligatory control, there is simply no lexical entailment.
Chierchia’s evidence for this approach is based on the following data. First, the only
conclusion that follows is that Nando likes to play tennis too, not that Nando likes
Ezio’s tennis play.
(139) Nando likes everything Ezio likes.
(140) Ezio likes playing tennis.
(141) Therefore, Nando likes playing tennis.
The only possible interpretation of it in (142) is that Nando practiced playing tennis, not
that Nando practiced Ezio’s playing of tennis, which does not make sense.
(142) Ezio practiced playing tennis for a year and Nando practiced it for a month.
To be more abstract, Chierchia first posits the existence of a hierarchy of θ-roles, which
may vary in the case of the subject control predicate promise.
(143) Theme > Goal > Agent
Next, he posits the following entailment:
(144) E(Br [P]) → E(Br [P/P*(θ(B))])
B is the matrix predicate, and P is the infinitival predicate. B is an r-eventuality (an even-
tuality of type r) that takes P as an argument. An r-eventuality is obtained in which P is
replaced by the ordered pair <P,x>. "x" bears a θ-role with respect to B. θ, a partial func-
tion from an eventuality to a participant, delivers the controller.
This will be illustrated with the example John tried to eat. B is the predicate try and P is
the infinitival predicate eat. The partial function, θ, delivers the agent John when it takes
B as an argument. This gives us the ordered pair <eat, John>, which is what control is
according to Chierchia.
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In doing so, Chierchia provides an account that gives explanations for the semantic
facts in control that we have seen previously. It is the only approach that has been con-
sidered so far to give a solution to the Minimal Distance Principle problem involving
promise, by claiming that this verb involves a different hierarchy of θ-roles.
The problem with this approach is that its syntactic approach is not well-developed,
in particular because it does not posit the existence of PRO or layers above VP in the in-
finitival complement. Given that this approach does not posit the existence of PRO, it
cannot begin to account the aforementioned cases of partial and split control in the pre-
vious sections.
Although it might be able to account for the fact that only predicates with semantic
tense allow partial control, it cannot tell us how a reading of partial control is derived
given that there is no PRO. Chierchia’s function delivers the "controller," but it does
not tell us why the infinitival predicate is interpreted as a group containing more than
just the controller. For split control, at least in this version of the entailment, Chierchia’s
function cannot give us more than one controller.15
In addition, because it posits that the infinitive is a bare VP, the reason why there is
evidence of wh-movement in tough-constructions, as well as complementizers attaching
to Hebrew control infinitives is mysterious, and this fact can only be explained if control
infinitives are clauses, not bare verb phrases. Furthermore, it is not clear how PRO can
get visible Case in Icelandic if it does not exist. Finally, the existence of backward control
seems to be impossible under this approach, since PRO does not exist and the θ-function
delivers the controller, which is PRO in backward control.
15But it might be possible to imagine a different entailment for the control predicates that do allow split
control, in which the θ-function might be able to deliver a set containing both of the controllers rather
than just one.
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3.6 Control as Agree
The final approach to control that will be considered in this chapter is, along with con-
trol as raising, the most modern one. It also uses the tools provided by Chomsky’s min-
imalist program, but rather than eliminating the θ-Criterion, it tries to reduce control to
the syntactic operation Agree.16 In particular, the matrix probe Agrees with an embed-
ded goal, in which the probe is a functional head and the goal is PRO or the embedded
C in control infinitives, which are made of CPs.
This approach was first conceived of by Landau (1999) in order to explain two kinds
of control, partial and finite. Three kinds of features exist: [Agr], [T] and [R]. [+Agr]
specifies overt agreement while [−Agr] specifies implicit agreement. [+T] specifies the
presence of semantic tense, found in partial control predicates. [−T] is its absence. These
two features are found on T0 and C0. [+R] is found on DPs which are referentially inde-
pendent, such as R-expressions, while [−R] is found on DPs which are dependent, such
as PRO and anaphors.
Landau posits the existence of the following rules to put uninterpretable [R] features
to drive Agree on probes; if the probe does not possess [T] or [Agr] features the rule
does not apply.
(145) [+T,+Agr] → [+T,+Agr,+R] if both T and Agr are +
(146) [T,Agr] → [T,Agr,−R] if one of T or Agr is −
The first rule implies that a probe with those features requires a local referentially de-
pendent DP to check off its uninterpretable [+R]. Similarly, the second rule implies that
a probe with those features requires a local PRO to check off its uninterpretable [−R]
feature. The "interesting generalization that emerges is that “fully specified clauses” –
typically, indicatives – would never exhibit OC, but any type of “partially specified”
clause might. This reverses the traditional view, by which PRO-environments form a
16This operation will be further elaborated in Chapter 4.
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natural class defined by a single syntactic criterion (e.g., ungoverned, null case, no case
etc.)" (Landau, 2013, p.67). So an advantage of this approach is that PRO can bear Case,
as seen in previous examples of Icelandic.
Partial control now has an excellent elaboration. PC complements have C with the
feature [+T], signifying semantic tense, while non-PC (exhaustive control, EC) comple-
ments have no semantic tense, or [−T]. EC complements are not specified for [Agr], so
it is not a possible goal for Agree, but PC is. Landau believes that Agree ignores the fea-
ture [semantic plurality] on PRO that distinguishes it from its controller, so it makes no
difference.
Landau is the first to try and synthesize both semantic and syntactic facts in control
by coming up with features such as [+T]. However, while it provides a strong explana-
tion of partial control, it does not do so for split control, a closely related phenomenon.
In addition, it also cannot derive backward, copy and control inside islands (adjuncts
and subjects). Finally, if adjuncts may involve OC, this would be troublesome for this
approach as all adjuncts are NOC due to being islands for Agree.
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3.7 Concluding Remarks
Multiple of the most well-known approaches to control theory were considered. All of
these approaches have their advantages: control as raising, binding and predication all
attempt to reduce control theory to something else, and try to come up with explana-
tions for the troubled existence of PRO. Landau’s control as Agree, meanwhile, provides
a very well-developed way of accounting for partial control and finite control, while giv-
ing importance to both syntax and semantics.
But all of these approaches account only for subsets of the phenomena seen in Chap-
ter 2, while being unable to derive much of it. In particular, the existence of split control
seems to trouble all of these theories. But we can learn from Landau’s successes in his
attempts to derive a significant chunk of control theory, as I try to come up with an alter-
nate way to derive control as Agree in Chapter 4.
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4 Deriving Obligatory Control from Syntax and Seman-
tics
4.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter introduces the reader to the theory of control advocated by this thesis. It
is one that is mostly based on the operation Agree between the control predicate and
the controllee, usually PRO, and the controller: these two Agree steps establish control
when the set containing the index of the controller is a subset of the set containing the
index of the controller and the semantics is satisfied at LF.
Section 2 establishes some components of this theory of control, adding features to
drive Agreement, a semantic foundation based on Farkas (1988), a control calculus to
ensure that obligatory control exists and the use of the subset relation instead of a strict
identity relation between the indexes of the controller and the controllee. This is neces-
sary due to the existence of partial control, in which the indexes are not equal. Section 3
derives the structures of the following control constructions: subject control, object con-
trol, subject control across a DP, control shift, partial, split, backward and copy control.
The intention is to introduce the reader to a theory of control which has two main ad-
vantages. The first is that it can derive many control constructions, including the un-
solved split control construction, and does not focus on deriving just one aspect of con-
trol theory. The second is that this theory of control, unlike others, gives importance to
both syntax and semantics in establishing control, which a strong theory must include.
4.2 Preliminaries
The overall idea behind the theory of control as presented in this thesis is that the pred-
icate first Agrees with the controllee with the use of specific unvalued features on the
predicate, and it then Agrees with the controller. The narrow syntax is able to keep track
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of the indexes of the controllee and controller with the control calculus, which is paired to
each control predicate. This information is maintained after Transfer to LF. In LF, if the
set containing the index of the controller is a subset of the set containing the index of the
controllee, and if all the relevant semantics of the controllee and the controller is satis-
fied, the derivation is grammatical. Otherwise, it crashes. This process is only present
with obligatory control.
The three components of the control module in natural language according to this
thesis are given below.
(147) The features: PRO, and other referentially dependent DPs, possess the feature
[−R]. Referentially independent DPs such as R-expressions possess the feature
[+R].17 The control predicate possesses two unvalued features: [u+R] to Probe for
the controller and [u−R] to Probe for the controllee.
(148) The control calculus: Each control predicate possesses a control calculus, a mech-
anism that keeps track of the index of the controller and the controllee. In LF, the
control calculus pays attention to the lexical semantics of the control predicate.
(149) The subset relation: For a controller(s) of index x and a controllee of index y: if
{x} ⊆ {y} in the control calculus then the derivation moves to LF.
Another component that is assumed to be independent of the control module, that
might be a part of the binding module, is given in (150). This component is needed for
the control calculus to keep track of the index of each DP that the predicate Probes for.18
(150) Index Feature Formation Rule: For any syntactic object with index i, it has the
syntactic feature [i].
The reasoning behind (147) is simple. The operation Agree is used to capture Hornstein
(1999) and Williams (1980)’s intuitions that obligatory control involves c-commanding
17This idea was originally conceived of by Landau (1999).
18Future research may show how such a rule could be used to derive binding theory alongside control
theory, making it possible to unify binding and control both as an Agree approach.
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antecedents.19 Features force the predicate to Probe for the c-commanded controllee and
controller. The index feature present on these DPs allows the control calculus in (148) to
keep track of it.
Perhaps the most controversial yet most important is (148), which is a mechanism
that is paired to each obligatory control predicate. It is present in the narrow syntax and
it is intimately related to the lexical semantics of each control predicate. The control cal-
culus may be represented with the following table.
(151)
Index 1: ∅ / θ
Index 2: ∅ / θ
Control: {∅2} ⊆ {∅1}
The control calculus possesses two empty slots for index features; in the case of predi-
cates which take a subject and an object–this includes cases such as control with promise,
control shift and split control–it possesses three empty slots. It is filled by the index fea-
tures of potential controllees and controllers, and the semantic acceptability of these
is determined in LF. Some conception of an order may be necessary: naturally, it is as-
sumed that the first slot is filled by the index of the first Probe and the second slot is
filled by the index of the second Probe.
The semantic acceptability of a given index is determined by the semantic role that
the slot is paired with.20 The relevant semantic roles are from another theory of control,
but one that is purely semantic, in this case by Farkas (1988).
Farkas argues for a semantic notion of Responsibility (RESP): RESP(i,s) holds be-
tween an initiator i and a situation s just in case i brings about s. An example is given
in the following sentences: Mary is responsible for both of the situations, that is, taking
out the trash, in the infinitival, given that object control is in (152) and subject control is
in (153) and we associate Mary with both situations.
19Since, if A c-commands B and B c-commands C, then A c-commands C. Therefore the controller c-
commands the controllee.
20Here, I do not need to assume an ad hoc syntactic version of the θ-Criterion.
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(152) John persuaded Mary to take out the trash.
(153) Mary promised John to take out the trash.
While one may argue that a semantic relation solely for a theory of control is ad hoc,
Farkas shows that this relation is independent of control, having an importance in de-
riving grammaticality in rationale clauses, sentences with intentionally, and positive im-
peratives. This is seen in the examples (154)-(159).
(154) The shop window has a big sale sign in order to attract customers.
(155) *John resembles his father in order to annoy his grandmother.
(156) John was intentionally seen by the best specialist.
(157) *John was intentionally watched by his neighbors.
(158) Be polite!
(159) *Be tall!
Farkas assumes that the controller must have a responsibility relation to the situation
described in the infinitival. However, the controllee need not have a specific semantic
relation to the situation in the infinitival. PRO need not be the Agent of a situation; for
example, in John tried to be happy, PRO is the experiencer but John is still the initiator of
the situation be happy.
With this semantic background in hand, we can start moving towards a theory of con-
trol that incorporates both syntax and semantics. I assume that each empty slot for an
index is paired with a semantic role. I posit the existence of the following control calcu-
lus for generic control predicates such as try which do not have objects.21
(160)
Index 1: ∅1 / θ
Index 2: ∅2 / RESP
Control: {RESP} ⊆ {θ}
21As we will see later in this chapter, there are three slots in the control calculus for indexes when a
predicate can take two DP arguments. Such a control calculus will be shown in the upcoming sections.
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This control calculus ensures that the first index slot, belonging to PRO, can have any
θ-role, whereas the controller is responsible for the situation in the infinitival. Once the
slots are filled and after the derivation is moved to LF, the grammar checks to see if the
subset relation is fulfilled along with the semantics of each DP as represented in the cal-
culus. If it is, the derivation proceeds, and if not, the derivation crashes.22 This accounts
for the non-control shift cases of control.
Landau (2013) argues that the role of syntax in Farkas’s account is completely acci-
dental and not motivated at all, with the following sentence. It is an accident that PRO
cannot refer to Harry.
(161) Harry1 knew that Fred2 owed some money to Richard, so he1 gave him2 a loan to
settle this. Fred2 then promised Richard [PRO*1/2 to pay back his debt].
My syntactic approach solves Landau’s problem, by combining Farkas’s approach and
the Agree operation. In this case it is not coincidental, it is expected given the local na-
ture of Agree.
The semantic relation in control shift is slightly different. Instead of the initiator, it is
the person whose actions are determined by the initiator. She terms this relation A(i, x). In
the following example, John’s actions are determined by the initiator, Mary.
(162) Johnj persuaded Mary PROj to be allowed to take out the trash.
The final line of the control calculus is used to determine whether control is established.
Once all slots are filled, the calculus checks whether Slot 2 ⊆ Slot 1. If this relation holds,
then control is established and the derivation proceeds. If not, control is not established
and the derivation crashes.
If one thinks that assuming a certain order is ad hoc, another way to ensure the correct
22I leave it an open question as to where exactly this grammaticality check takes place. Does it happen
in the narrow syntax as the derivation proceeds, or does it happen in the Logical Form after transfer? This
would have to be determined with future research; independent evidence is needed to determine whether
this ungrammaticality is syntactic or semantic. But given the idea in minimalist syntax that syntax ought
to be as simple as possible, a control calculus that can make sentences ungrammatical in the narrow syn-
tax may seem ad hoc. Therefore, it may be more reasonable to think that ungrammaticality arises in LF.
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result can be to determine the truth of the statement Slot 1 ⊆ Slot 2 ∨ Slot 2 ⊆ Slot 1. If
one of the conjuncts is true, then the entire statement is true. This derives the same re-
sults as seen in this chapter, but for the sake of simplicity, I assume that such an order is
built into the calculus.
Finally, a subset relation is used rather than strict identity due to the problems of par-
tial and split control. A set is made up of each syntactic index feature: for [i] we get the
set {i}. If the set for the index of the controller(s) is a subset for that of the controllee,
the control calculus does not cause the derivation to crash. The definition of a subset
is given in (163).
(163) A ⊆ B def= (A ⊂ B) ∨ (A = B)
"=" refers to strict identity whereas "⊂" refers to a proper subset. For example, {x} is a
proper subset of {x, y}. 3 definitions below are used to ensure that the checking of the
subset relation goes smoothly in LF. (164) defines the set containing the index of split
control PRO. (165) uses the union operation between the sets of the index of the con-
trollers to derive the subset relation in split control. Finally, (166) defines the set contain-
ing the index of a partial control PRO, and ensures that the set containing the index of
the controller is a proper subset.
(164) {x+y} def= {x,y}
(165) {x} ∪ {y} def= {x+y}
(166) {x+} def= {x, ...} ∧ |{x+}| > 1
In the case of exhaustive (not partial or split) control, the controller and PRO share the
same index, so the subset relation is satisfied as the two sets are equal.
Partial control shows the need of the subset relation as opposed to strict identity be-
tween the two sets, as the index of PRO includes the index of the controller but is greater
than it. Split control involves the union between the two sets containing the indexes of
the controllers, which is a subset of PRO.
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(167) Exhaustive control: {x} ⊆ {x} because {x} = {x}
(168) Partial control: {x} ⊆ {x+} because {x} ⊂ {x, ...}
(169) Split control: {x} ∪ {y} ⊆ {x+y} because {x,y} = {x,y}
An alternative to using the union operation for split control is to individually determine
if both of the sets containing the indexes of the controllers are subsets.
(170) {x} ⊂ {x,y} ∧ {y} ⊂ {x,y}
To conclude, these derivations apply only to cases of obligatory control. In NOC, which
often involves PROarb, the control calculus and features are completely absent: although
one might object to this as ad hoc, Chapter 5 will show that all control predicates which
allow NOC have a certain lexical semantic feature that may or may not preclude these
components from being present.
4.3 Derivations
With these features, the control calculus and definitions at hand, we can try deriving the
simple sentence (13) below.
(171) John tried to be happy.
The part of the derivation that concerns us starts when the control predicate try takes the
control infinitive, a CP as established in Chapter 2, as its complement. PRO and try have
the following feature geometry.
(172) try: [u−R], [u+R]
(173) PRO: [−R], [i]
Starting with PRO, the Index Feature Formation rule creates a feature of PRO’s own syn-
tactic index, [i], on PRO. Because it is an anaphor, it has the feature [−R]. try has two
new features: to force Agreement with PRO, it has an unvalued [u−R] feature and to
Probe for the controller, it has an unvalued [u+R] feature. The derivation starts in (174).
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(174) VP
V0
tried
[u+R]
[u−R]
CP
C0 TP
DPi
PRO
[−R]
[i]
T’
T0
to
VP
be happy
Index 1: ∅1
Index 2: ∅2
Control: {∅2} ⊆ {∅1}
A CP phase was formed as there are no unvalued features within the CP.23 try checks off
its [u−R] feature with the [−R] feature of PRO. The control calculus keeps track of the
index of PRO, which is i. Naturally, the first slot is filled with the first instance of Agree,
and the second slot by the second instance.
23As in Chomsky (2000, 2001)’s conception of phases, control infinitives are weak phases in which
Transfer to PF or Transfer of LF does not take place, it is possible for Agreement from outside the phase to
take place inside the phase. For a view in which weak phases allow Transfer to PF but not Transfer to LF,
restricting movement but not Agreement, see Richards (2011).
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(175) VP
V0
tried
[u+R]
[u−R]
CP
C0 TP
DPi
PRO
[−R]
[i]
T’
T0
to
VP
be happy
Index 1: i
Index 2: ∅2
Control: {∅2} ⊆ {i}
The second part of the derivation that concerns us is when try moves up by Head Move-
ment, conjoining to v0 to form another v0, which takes on the unvalued features of try24,
which is still [u+R]. The subject John Merges to Spec,vP.
24Chomsky (2000) notes that, although labels are copies of the projecting item, exceptions are made for
the consequences of Agree.
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(176) vP
DPi
John
[+R]
[i]
v’
v0
v0 V0
tried
[u+R]
[u−R]
VP
tried PROi to be happy
Index 1: i
Index 2: ∅2
Control: {∅2} ⊆ {i}
v’ Probes for the subject; this is possible since both c-command each other.25 This checks
off the remaining unvalued features on the control predicate, and the calculus keeps
track of the index of the controller, which is also i. After the derivation proceeds to LF,
the calculus checks the semantic roles of the controller and the controllee and to see
whether the subset relation has been established. Since all of these are satisfied, the
derivation does not crash and is grammatical.
25Béjar & Rezac (2009) point out that this is possible in Chomsky (1995)’s conception of Bare Phrase
Structure. When v is Merged to VP it creates {v, {v, VP}}. The search space of the label v is therefore {v,
VP}. Merging with the subject yields {v, {John, {v, {v, VP}}}}. The search space of v then becomes {John,
v, VP}. Given how labels project in BPS and that one label of v0 is a nondominating sister of John, it can
Probe. This label is marked with a circle on (176)-(177).
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(177) vP
DPi
John
[+R]
[i]
v’
v0
v0 V0
tried
[u+R]
[u−R]
VP
tried PROi to be happy
Index 1: i / EXP
Index 2: i / RESP
Control: {i} ⊆ {i}
What would happen if the index of the controller and PRO differed? It is assumed that
this would lead to the derivation crashing because the set containing the index of the
controller is not a subset of the set containing the index of PRO.
(178) vP
DPm
John
[+R]
[m]
v’
v0
v0 V0
tried
[u+R]
[u−R]
VP
tried PROi to be happy
Index 1: i
Index 2: m
Control: {m} * {i}
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To recap, we’ve seen how the usage of these features on the predicate, controller and
controllee can derive simple control phenomena. Although the usage of these features
may at first glance overly complicate what could be a much simpler derivation–as in
Hornstein (1999) where control is just raising–this approach attempts to derive many
different control structures rather than focusing on just one, showing the need for these
relatively complicated features.
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.1, approaches such as Hornstein
(1999) often lead to many more problems that one has to come up with much more com-
plicated solutions to fix, even if they are simpler at first glance. The next sections will
give the derivations of more complex control structures that other approaches have not
been able to derive, such as split control.
4.3.1 Object control
The derivation of control in object control verbs is the point at which we have to start
assuming the existence of control calculi with three empty slots rather than two. This
is required given the phenomenon of control shift, subject control across a DP and split
control. This thesis argues that the only difference in the derivation between these phe-
nomena is the different structures of the control calculi, and a control calculus for each
of these will be presented in this chapter.
In essence, the control predicate Agrees with PRO, the controller and the argument
which is not controlling PRO. In a sentence such as John persuaded Mary PRO to be happy,
the control predicate persuade Agrees with John, Mary and PRO. However, it only cares
about the relation {RESP} ⊆ {θ}. Given that John bears the relation A to the situation
and not RESP, it is effectively ignored. With this information, I posit the following con-
trol calculus for cases involving object.
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(179)
Index 1: ∅1 / θ
Index 2: ∅2 / RESP
Index 3: ∅3 / A
Control: {RESP} ⊆ {θ}
The predicate checks off one of its unvalued features with PRO and then the other with
the nearest DP object, purely due to syntactic locality; lexical semantics does not play a
role here. The derivation is given in (180). First, the control predicate checks off its fea-
tures with the nearest two DPs, PRO and John, keeping track of their indexes.26
(180) Mary persuaded John to take out the trash.
(181) VP
DPi
John
[+R]
[i]
V’
V0
persuaded
[u+R]
[u−R]
[u+R]
CP
C0 TP
DPi
PRO
[−R]
[i]
T’
to take out the trash
Index 1: i / θ
Index 2: i / RESP
Index 3: ∅3 / A
Control: {i} ⊆ {i}
Next, Mary Merges onto the tree after persuade Merges onto the v0 head. The control
26The astute reader will notice that the trash is also a DP that has a [+R] feature. Indeed, the control
predicate could keep track of its feature, as it can Agree with it prior to John Merging onto the root of the
tree, and this would be a flaw with the system. For this, I propose the No Descending Condition which I will
elaborate further in Chapter 5.
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predicate does Agree with it and keep track of its index, but this is extraneous since it
is not relevant to the control relation. This is a necessary assumption to make as we will
see in just the next section.
(182) vP
DPk
Mary
[+R]
[i]
v’
v0
v0 V0
persuaded
[u+R]
[u−R]
[u+R]
VP
Johni PROi to take out the trash
Index 1: i / θ
Index 2: i / RESP
Index 3: k / A
Control: {i} ⊆ {i}
4.3.2 Subject control across a DP
As it is for most approaches to control, subject control across a DP is the most difficult
to derive; since control is derived by Agree, some form of the Minimal Link Condition
or Relativized Minimality will necessitate that the predicate cannot just skip past the
nearest DP. It has to Agree with it. However, this approach proposes that it has almost
exactly the same derivation as for object control. The only difference between the two
derivations is that the control calculus for subject control predicates has a different con-
trol requirement: the set containing the bearer of the relation A must be a subset of the
set containing the index of PRO. In more mathematical terms, the relation to establish
control in the case of promise is {A} ⊆ {θ} rather than {RESP} ⊆ {θ}.
52
Why do verbs such as promise have a different control calculus? It is assumed that,
following Culicover & Jackendoff (2001), the semantic role Source is what causes sub-
ject control in this predicate, and this is represented by my approach as having a differ-
ent control calculus. A major consequence of this solution is that it rejects the autonomy
of syntax as proposed by Chomsky (1957), which provides a basis for semantics rather
than including it in the grammar. But control phenomena as seen in Chapter 2 show the
need for a unified syntax and semantics approach to control, where both play a part in
deriving sentences.
An assumption will need to be made to ensure that extraneous Agreement does not
occur a second time with the same DP, as there are two [u+R] features. Both could be
checked off before promise has the chance to Agree with the subject and get the second
necessary index. In addition, one could argue that both features could be checked off
by one Agree operation, as they are the same feature. To prevent this, we need a couple
more rules.
(183) Multiple Unvalued Feature Rule: For a syntactic object with two of the same kind
of unvalued feature [uX], only one instantiation can be checked off per Agree
operation.
(184) Multiple Agreement Rule: A syntactic object with unvalued feature [uX] cannot
Probe for the same syntactic object with feature [X] more than once.
The example derivations are given below in (185)-(187). As in object control, the pred-
icate keeps track of the index features of the DPs John and PRO. However, the control
relation is not yet satisfied, given the different requirement.
(185) Mary promised John to take out the trash.
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(186) VP
DPk
John
[+R]
[i]
V’
V0
promised
[u+R]
[u−R]
[u+R]
CP
C0 TP
DPi
PRO
[−R]
[i]
T’
to take out the trash
Index 1: i / θ
Index 2: k / RESP
Index 3: ∅3 / A
Control: {θ} ⊆ {i}
Once again, the control predicate keeps track of the index of its subject, Mary after it
Merges onto the root of the tree. Given that it bears the relation A to the situation, at LF,
the control relation is satisfied and the structure is deemed grammatical.
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(187) vP
DPi
Mary
[+R]
[i]
v’
v0
v0 V0
promised
[u+R]
[u−R]
[u+R]
VP
Johnk PROi to take out the trash
Index 1: i / θ
Index 2: k / RESP
Index 3: i / A
Control: {i} ⊆ {i}
4.3.3 Control shift
Control shift is the phenomenon in which object control predicates can switch to subject
control predicates and vice versa, if the infinitival clause is passivized.
(188) Johnj persuaded Marym PROj/*m to be allowed to take out the trash.
(189) Johnj promised Marym PROm/*j to be allowed to take out the trash.
The derivation that this thesis proposes for control shift is a more formal version of
Farkas (1988)’s solution which argues for a markedness principle that selects for the
relation A rather than RESP (this is inverted in the case of promise). The formalized
markedness principle here involves predicates such as persuade taking on the control cal-
culus of promise, while predicates such as promise take on the control calculus of persuade.
In other words, control shift in sentences with persuade is very simply derived the same
way as promise without shifting, and vice versa.
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4.3.4 Split control
Landau (2013) notes that no approach to control has to date been able to account for
split control. Thanks to the subset relation used to establish control, the approach pro-
posed here does so straightforwardly.
Split control involves Agreement between two controllers of indexes x and y, and a
controllee of index x+y, which includes both of the controllers and nothing else. The
derivation for split control is almost identical to that of derivations with object control.
The only difference is the different logical relation to satisfy control, {x} ∪ {y} ⊆ {x+y}.
The example derivation is in (190)-(192) below, with the same example sentence as in
section 4.5, except with together added to force the split control reading of PRO.
(190) Mary promised John to take out the trash together.
(191) VP
DPk
John
[+R]
[i]
V’
V0
promised
[u+R]
[u−R]
[u+R]
CP
C0 TP
DPi+k
PRO
[−R]
[i]
T’
to take...
Index 1: i / θ
Index 2: k / RESP
Index 3: ∅3 / A
Control: {i} ∪ {∅3} ⊆ {i+k}
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(192) vP
DPi
Mary
[+R]
[i]
v’
v0
v0 V0
promised
[u+R]
[u−R]
[u+R]
VP
Johnk PROi+k to take...
Index 1: i / θ
Index 2: k / RESP
Index 3: i / A
Control: {i} ∪ {k} ⊆ {i+k}
It follows from the definitions of {i}, {k} and {i+k} that the control relation is satisfied.
4.3.5 Partial control
To recap, partial control involves control when PRO has an index greater than but in-
cluding i, the index of the controller, written as i+. As it was considered a problem at the
time, Landau (1999)’s control as Agree approach was conceived of primarily to derive
partial control.
Control in these predicates is derived in exactly the same way as in exhaustive con-
trol. As strict identity is not possible between an index i and i+, control is established
with use of sets and the subset relation. The control predicate first Agrees with PRO,
keeping track of the index i+.
(193) John tried to meet at 6.
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(194) VP
V0
tried
[u+R]
[u−R]
CP
C0 TP
DPi+
PRO
[−R]
[i+]
T’
T0
to
VP
meet at 6
Index 1: i+
Index 2: ∅
Control: {i} ⊆ {i+}
A control relation is established when the control predicate Agrees with the subject, as
{i} is a subset of {i+}, the derivation would be considered grammatical at LF.
(195) vP
DPi
John
[+R]
[i]
v’
v0
v0 V0
tried
[u+R]
[u−R]
VP
PROi+ to meet at 6
Index 1: i+
Index 2: i
Control:
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This approach does not distinguish between deriving exhaustive and partial control in
the narrow syntax. Landau notes that partial control predicates have semantic tense to
distinguish them, and it would be nice to involve this feature in the derivation.
There are multiple ways to do this, but perhaps the simplest way is to assume that se-
mantically tensed control predicates have the feature [+tense] while only PRO can pos-
sess the feature [u+tense]. This feature could be checked off as a reflex of Agree when
the predicate Probes. This is similar to how wh-features are checked off in English.
4.3.6 Backward control
One of the main advantages of the view of control as Agree as given in this thesis is that
it has a very straightforward way of accounting for backward control, a property that
it shares with control as raising. It does not matter when the control predicate satisfies
its unvalued features, as long as it checks them off. The control predicate first checks off
[u+R] rather than [u−R], which is checked off second, and the derivation moves to LF.
In other words, the derivation of backward control is almost identical to that of oblig-
atory control. For the sake of simplicity in this derivation27, we will use the following
sentence with backward control in Tsez translated into English. As noted, in Tsez, con-
tinue is a backward control predicate.
(196) PROi continued Johni to feed the cow.
27I’ve used a control calculus with two empty slots rather than three, as would be the usual case for a
predicate with a DP subject and an object, for the sake of simplicity as well.
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(197) VP
V0
continued
[u+R]
[u−R]
CP
C0 TP
DPi
John
[+R]
[i]
T’
T0
to
VP
feed the cow
Index 1: i
Index 2: ∅
Control: ∅
The control predicate first checks off its [u+R] feature rather than [u−R], simply because
it is nearer. Only after PRO is Merged to Spec,vP is [u−R] checked off.
(198) vP
DPi
PRO
[−R]
[i]
v’
v0
v0 V0
continued
[u+R]
[u−R]
VP
Johni to feed the cow
Index 1: i
Index 2: i
Control:
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The reason why some languages do not allow backward control would simply be be-
cause they do not allow PRO in the subject position of a finite TP; alternatively, Princi-
ples B or C of binding theory may be at play in these languages. This would be the case
in most languages, apart from languages such as Tsez.
Although backward control is derived, there might be some difficulty in explaining
why only certain predicates allow it; Polinsky & Potsdam (2002) notes that Tsez allows
only a few aspectual verbs such as began and continue to have backward control. But one
could assume that most verbs in Tsez do not allow a silent PRO in subject position, but
there are a few that do. Perhaps certain classes of verbs have different phonological re-
quirements for their subjects, unlike languages such as English. We should be able to see
this show up for other silent subjects as well.
4.3.7 Copy control
Copy control is more difficult to derive than backward control, since copy control does
not involve PRO, which has the syntactic feature [−R], and control predicates have the
unvalued syntactic feature [u−R]. This means that Agreement is unable to take place.
One can assume that control predicates in languages which allow copy control have
another [+R] feature rather than a [u−R] feature for Agreement to take place, allowing
for the grammar to establish the control relation between the two copies.
61
(199) VP
DPi
John
[+R]
[i]
V’
V0
wants
[u+R]
[u+R]
CP
C0 TP
DPi
John
[+R]
[i]
T’
T0
to
VP
be happy
Index 1: i
Index 2: i
Control:
Such languages may have two different varieties for each control predicate, one with
two [u+R] features when copy control is intended, and one with one [u+R] and one
[u−R] feature, as is the usual case in control. Copy control would not be allowed for lan-
guages in which the second variety of control predicate is not present.
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4.4 Concluding Remarks
This chapter introduced the reader to a theory of control which, with some assumptions
and theoretical tools, is capable of deriving many control phenomena. But it does so by
giving importance to lexical semantics in deriving control in the narrow syntax, which
can be both a boon and a bane; while it is able to account for the elusive case of promise,
it contradicts Chomsky (1957)’s intuitions about the independent role of syntax in mak-
ing structures for semantics to fill: syntax and semantics work together to derive control
in promise.
Chapter 5 goes on to discuss the many theoretical implications of these assumptions
and I attempt to derive the most problematic structures for this approach, which are fi-
nite and adjunct control; these structures necessitate Agreement inside islands.
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5 Theoretical Consequences
5.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter goes over the theoretical consequences and problems that arise from this
approach to control theory. Section 5.2 discusses some of the immediate theoretical
predictions of this approach. Section 5.3 discusses Chomsky’s classic conundrum of
whether semantics plays a part in deriving grammatical sentences, and gives evidence
from subject control and tough-predicates to argue that lexical semantics does contribute
to grammaticality. Section 5.4 derives NOC facts, and accounts for individual variations
in grammaticality for control sentences. Section 5.5 goes over the greatest problem for
this approach: control inside finite clauses and adjuncts. Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 Predictions: Split-Partial Control and No Descending Condition
The subset relation is used to derive partial and split control: my approach assumes that
the set containing the index of the controller is a subset of the set containing the index
of a partial control PRO, and that the union of the sets of the two sets containing the in-
dexes of the controllers is the subset of the set containing the index of split control PRO.
As Kenji Oda (p.c.) has pointed out to me, one might assume the existence of a set such
as {(x+y)+}, which contains the index of PRO. It does seem to be a case that, even in En-
glish, we can have PRO with indexes such as this.
In other words, it is theoretically possible, given the loose definition I have given for
{x+}, that {x+y} is a subset of {(x+y)+}. Call this split-partial control. This is a prediction
of my approach, and therefore, it would be a strength if we found sentences with this in
English. And it seems that we do. Notice that promise is a desiderative, as Landau (2013)
argues, and this class of predicates have semantic tense, meaning that partial control is
possible with the split control predicate promise. The sentence in (5.2) seems to be gram-
matical.
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(200) Johni promised Maryk PROi+k+ to meet the group at 6.
Another theoretically plausible consequence is that {x+y} is a subset of {x+}. This also
seems to be predicted. With the correct context given for the example above, it is pos-
sible to imagine a context in which the object of the verb is not a part of the referent of
PRO at all.
(201) Johni promised Maryk PROi+ to meet the group at 6.
Therefore, this thesis predicts the existence of two phenomena that have yet to be doc-
umented in the literature. One might also posit the existence of partial-split control,
which would be defined as {(x+)+y} rather than {(x+y)+}. However, given the defini-
tions that I have given in Chapter 4, the two sets are identical and therefore not separate
phenomena.
Another theoretical prediction of this approach is that, once a syntactic object Probes
for the nearest Goal, it cannot Probe lower in the tree than that Goal. Notice that the con-
verse would lead to contradictory derivations in my approach. Take the sentence John
promised Mary to take out the trash. The trash is a DP as well, with a [+R] feature, the con-
trol predicate could potentially Agree with this right after Agreeing with PRO, given
that it is technically the nearest syntactic object with a [+R] feature prior to Mary merg-
ing as the object. This would lead to an ungrammatical derivation and an unintended
result. I propose the following condition which likely does not have any negative conse-
quences, given the local nature of syntactic derivations. I assume that the benefits of this
approach to control outweigh the need for a more parsimonious theory of syntax.
(202) No Descending Condition: After Agreement between a Probe A and a Goal B,
Probe A cannot Probe for a syntactic object c-commanded by Goal B.
Although the trash has a desired feature for the control predicate to check, this condition
will block Agreement between the predicate and the trash, given that PRO c-commands
the trash, deriving the intended result.
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5.3 Is Syntax Independent from Semantics?
The previous chapter introduced the reader to a theory of control that advocated a role
for lexical semantics in the derivation of a sentence in the narrow syntax. This has been
a point of great controversy since Chomsky (1957), who was the first to argue that syn-
tax is completely independent from semantics. A famous example is given in (203), a
meaningless sentence that is nonetheless grammatical:
(203) Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.
For Chomsky, such examples show that syntax is independent from semantics, as it pro-
vides structures for which words are then lexically inserted into. The burden of proof, as
Chomsky puts it, is on the linguist who believes that they have been able to develop a
notion of grammaticality in terms of semantics.
While many linguists have noted the importance of lexical semantics in syntactic phe-
nomena, this thesis attempts to provide more evidence for the existence of a syntax-
semantics interface from the viewpoint of control theory. Starting with subject control,
what seems to be the difference between (204)-(205) is Culicover & Jackendoff (2001)’s
observation that the contrast between these two sentences from their paper is purely se-
mantic:
(204) John’s promise/vow/offer/guarantee/obligation/pledge/oath/commitment to
Susan to take care of himself/*herself
(205) John’s order/instructions/reminder/encouragement/invitation to Susan to take
care of *himself/herself
Culicover & Jackendoff (2001) argue that there is no syntactic difference whatsoever be-
tween (204)-(205). In the first sentence, we have subject control, while in the second sen-
tence we have object control, despite only differing in the choice of nominals.
Attempts to come up with a syntactic difference would be ad hoc as the sentences
are so similar. One way of doing so might be to take for granted that the θ-Criterion
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exists and is driven by features as in Hornstein (1999), and an approach similar to pro-
posed in this thesis in that control is made when the predicate Agrees with PRO and its
controller. Rather than having [u+R] and [u−R] features drive Probing, one could use
θ-features to drive Agree with some assumptions. This approach could assume that
promise attempts to Agree with a DP that has an Agent θ-role while other predicates
Agree with the nearest Theme θ-role-bearing DP. This approach, however, is very com-
plicated and assumes the existence of the ad hoc syntactic θ-Criterion.
A much simpler solution would be to assume that the nouns in (204) bear the the-
matic role Source, the giver of the promise, which for whatever reason, forces subject
control. The nouns in (205) do not possess Source.
The approach proposed in this thesis formalizes this, giving a role for lexical seman-
tics in the narrow syntax. As seen in the previous chapter, each control predicate is
paired with a control calculus, that keeps track of the index of the controller and the con-
trollee with the operation Agree.
Each control calculi may have two or three slots for indexes. In the case of subject
control, one slot in the calculus has the requirement that it can only be satisfied by the
index of a DP that is the Source of the promise: in Farkas’s terms, the one that bears re-
lation A to the embedded infinitival. Further, the control predicate may only Agree with
each DP once. The nearest DP in the case of subject control is Probed extraneously, after
which it Agrees with the subject. This guarantees subject control.
Further, the semantic easiness scale may also provide more evidence in favor of this
interaction. In particular, tough-adjectives on the easiness scale and those which are not
can influence whether control is obligatory or non-obligatory. Consider Brody (1993)’s
contrast between (206) and (207).
(206) *PRO to teach themi math is easy for the childreni.
(207) PRO to teach themi math is useful for the childreni
Similar to Culicover & Jackendoff’s examples, these sentences involve structures which
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are syntactically seemingly identical yet differ only in the choice of the control predi-
cate. Brody does not explore the consequences of this contrast, but one can find more
evidence for the importance of lexical semantics in syntax with further digging.
First, Kawasaki (1993)’s example of genuinely unrestricted PROarb with dangerous in
(208) can be extended to include other tough-predicates not on the easiness scale; that is,
it is possible to imagine a context where (209) and (210) are grammatical.
(208) It is dangerous/harmful/uncomfortable for babies [PROarb to smoke around
them].
(209) It is fun/exciting/enjoyable for babies [PROarb to blow bubbles around them].
(210) It is boring/unexciting/a pain for children [PROarb to help them learn math].
However, this is not possible when we consider tough-predicates that are not on the eas-
iness scale; it is difficult to imagine a context in which similar NOC sentences can be
grammatical. Often, such sentences seem meaningless. This is easily fixed by making
the sentence have OC in (212).
(211) *It is hard/impossible/difficult for children [PROarb to help them learn math].
(212) It is hard for childreni [PROi to learn math].
To recap, NOC with tough-predicates is only possible when the predicate is not on the
easiness scale; only OC is allowed when the predicate is on the easiness scale. What
all of these examples show is the need to involve lexical semantics in the derivation of
sentences. Contra Chomsky (1957), it would be difficult to imagine creating a system of
grammar that could derive the contrasts seen in this section without giving some refer-
ence to the lexical semantics of control predicates.
5.4 Non-Obligatory Control and Perceptual Factors
Although the previous chapter of this thesis derived OC, it did not comment on what
kind of a phenomenon NOC is, which, as Hornstein (1999)’s examples note in (213)-
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(216), seems to be at odds with the syntactic operations Move and Agree, both of which
use the notion of c-command, which this thesis relies on to derive OC.
(213) It was believed that [PRO shaving was important]. Classical NOC
(214) Johni thinks that it is believed that [PROi shaving himself is important]. Non-local
antecedent
(215) Clinton’si campaign believes that [PROi keeping his sex life under control] is nec-
essary for electoral success. Non-c-commanding
(216) Johni told Maryj [that [[PROi+j washing themselves/each other] would be fun]].
Split NOC
Hornstein (1999) is wrong to think that any of these are cases of arbitrary control. All of
these sentences can be rephrased to make the implicit controller visible: It was/is believed
by people and the last sentence can be rephrased as is necessary to Clinton for electoral suc-
cess. If Bhatt & Izvorski (1998) and others are correct in arguing that these examples do
not constitute NOC control, then OC control inside embedded finite clauses exists in En-
glish. It is particularly troubling for this approach as it would involve Agreement with
PRO which is inaccessible to syntactic operations inside Chomsky (2001)’s conception of
a strong phase.
What we need is a genuine case of arbitrary control, where there cannot be an im-
plicit experiencer to control PRO. We saw this in examples (208)-(210). How do we de-
rive these sentences? My answer to this is to say that the control calculus simply does
not play a role in these derivations, nor are these unvalued features present on the con-
trol predicate in cases of NOC.
Obligatory control predicates such as promise, persuade and managed necessarily in-
volve the presence of the unvalued features on the predicate. The few genuine NOC
predicates that we’ve discussed are all tough-predicates that are not on the easiness
scale, such as dangerous, embarrassing, fun. Perhaps these are the only NOC predicates
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that exist. For some reason, these predicates do not have the features [u+R] and [u−R];
alternatively they may still be around, but Agree is extraneous given the lack of the con-
trol calculus. But this gets us arbitrary control.
Another mechanism that is needed is some way to derive Chomsky (1981)’s observa-
tion that NOC PRO is necessarily [+human], as previously noted in Chapter 2. (218) is
awkward because it sounds like a person would be snowing, something that is impossi-
ble.
(217) For it to snow all day would prevent me from going to school.
(218) *To snow all day would prevent me from going to school.
A simple way of deriving this distinction is to give these tough-predicates a [u+human]
feature to ensure that these derivations give us NOC sentences with [+human] PRO.
Why is it that tough-predicates require NOC PRO to be [+human]? This is a question
that has to be answered by semanticists, and I leave it open for future research. How-
ever, one must note that the necessary presence of [+human] on PRO somehow pre-
cludes the presence of the control calculus.
A final point of observation to make regarding these unvalued features is that their
placement seems to be subject to personal attitudes and perceptual factors. While the
majority of the native English speakers I talked to found (211) ungrammatical, a sizable
portion thought that it was completely fine. Some went so far as to say that (208)-(210)
were all ungrammatical, even though a majority did accept them.
The influence of personal attitudes in control has been noted often in the literature.
Another example is long distance control, as seen in (219) is noted by Chierchia & Jacob-
son (1986) to have unclear intuitions. Long distance control is similar to subject control
in that the controller of PRO is not the most local DP. Some speakers cannot get it at all,
whereas most find it merely disfavorable but not ungrammatical.
(219) Maryi thought that Johni said that [PRO shaving herself] would bother Sue.
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So it is important for a theory of control to be able to account for why certain people dif-
fer in what they find grammatical. The approach advocated by this thesis is flexible, in
that each person may possess different features for control predicates. This can lead to
alternate derivations for each individual.
Although most native English speakers get NOC with tough-predicates not on the
easiness scale and OC with those on it, some speakers who do not fit this pattern exist.
Consider the person who finds arbitrary control ungrammatical in all tough-predicates.
Tough-predicates, for this person, would always possess the control calculus, regardless
of whether or not these predicates are on the easiness scale. Consider the admittedly
rare person that finds arbitrary control grammatical only with tough-predicates that are
on the easiness scale, and not grammatical with other predicates. This person would
have the opposite placement of [u+R] and [u−R] on the predicates that we discussed. In
this way, individual variation of grammaticality can be accounted with this approach.
5.5 Islands
The final consequence of this approach that will be considered in this thesis is an impor-
tant one. Examples (213)-(216) and (219), are cases in which a controller outside of the
embedded clause controls PRO inside the embedded clause, which is finite.
Another kind of obligatory control is finite control, which is attested in some lan-
guages: PRO is actually the subject of a finite embedded clause, and the embedded verb
has tense and agreement inflection. Landau (2013)’s example is reproduced below in
(220), and he shows that it is a case of OC.
(220) Rina
Rina
bikša
asked
me-Gili
from-Gil
[še-PROi
that
yivdok
would.check.3SG
šuv
again
et
ACC
ha-toca’ot].
the-results
’Rina asked Gil to double-check the results.’
The problem here is that, according to Chomsky (2001)’s conception of a phase, the em-
bedded finite clauses are not accessible for syntactic operations from outside the phase.
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In all of these examples, the controller is in the matrix clause. Discussing the nature of
phases will help guide us towards a solution.
Chomsky’s Phase Impenetrability Condition (PIC) was created in order to reduce the
computational burden that would be great in long sentences, while also getting us
cyclicity and capturing island phenomena. It is essentially the idea that derivations pro-
ceed in chunks, and movement out of a phase is not allowed: after it is completed, the
complement of the phase X0 is transferred to PF and LF for semantic and phonological
computation, inaccessible to further syntactic operations.
For Chomsky, strong phases are θ-complete vPs and CPs. Defective CPs are weak
phases, and an example of this would be control infinitives, because they are nonfinite,
along with passive vPs. Weak phases are not transferred to PF and LF, and they are open
to syntactic operations.28 A phase is complete when an entire phase is taken as a com-
plement of a head. Only the phase edge (the head and specifier of the phase, so C0 and
Spec,CP) is open to syntactic operations. The edge-feature on a head allows syntactic ob-
jects with unvalued features to move to the edge of the phase, and thereby move out.
Control infinitives are usually non-finite, so the phases are weak: they allow Agree-
ment inside them. However, (213)-(216) and (219) involve Agreement inside a strong
phase, the contents of which have already been transferred to PF and LF. They are not
open for any kind of syntactic operations from outside of the phase anymore. This
seems like a powerful counterargument to the idea that the control predicate Agrees
with PRO at all.
However, there is reason to think that we do get long-distance agreement inside finite
clauses. Bošković (2007) argues that the operation Agree is not subject to the PIC. He
notes that multiple languages allow agreement with an object inside a finite CP, such as
Chukchee in (221). The matrix v agrees with the object of the embedded clause, flaunt-
28Richards (2011) argues that weak phases restrict Movement but not Agreement, by allowing transfer
to PF to take place, but not transfer to LF.
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ing the PIC.29
(221) @nan
he
qelyilu-l@n@rk@-nin-et
regrets-3-PL
[inqun
that
∅-r@t@mn@v-nen-at
3SG-lost-3-PL
qora-t].
reindeer-PL
’He regrets that he lost the reindeers.’
This gives us reason to think that the syntactic operation Agree can penetrate both
strong and weak phases, and it is therefore possible to derive OC in finite clauses.
The final counterexample to consider is adjunct control, in which we have OC inside
adjuncts: examples are given in (222)-(224) below. Such examples are particularly trou-
bling as they also involve Agree inside environments which are impenetrable to syntac-
tic operations.
(222) He called us before looking around. Temporal clause
(223) He ate at Chipotle to fill his stomach. Goal clause
(224) He stopped to think what a fool he had been. Stimulus clause
However, Chomsky (2001)’s PIC was also created to account for the existence of islands,
among other things. It would be ad hoc to assume that there are syntactically impene-
trable environments other than phases, and we should try to unify these approaches:
Adger (2003) derives island phenomena by assuming the PIC and blocking the move-
ment of syntactic objects from classical islands, even though phases do allow Movement
in some circumstances. My solution is to propose that even islands are open to Agree,
but not Move.
This may be difficult for the syntactician to accept. However, it is worth noting that
all of the original evidence from Ross (1967) in favor of the existence of islands is that
it blocks Movement, but there is no evidence that the operation Agree is blocked. Sen-
tences (225)-(233) show five island constraints from Ross (1967), but these are just ex-
amples to illustrate that Ross’s evidence is that Movement is blocked, and there is no
reason to think that Agreement is blocked too.
29Frantz (1973) provides more evidence of Agreement into finite clauses in Blackfoot.
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(225) Which game did John say Bill played?
(226) *Which game did John wonder whether Bill played? Wh-island Constraint
(227) *Which game did John eat a sandwich before Bill played? Adjunct Constraint
(228) Who did John believe that Bill beat?
(229) *Who did John believe the claim that Bill beat? Complex Noun Phrase Constraint
(230) John bought a game and an apple.
(231) *What did John buy and an apple? Coordinate Structure Constraint
(232) That John played a game is true.
(233) Who is that played a game is true? Subject Constraint
Though there does not seem to be any evidence blocking Agree inside syntactic islands,
many, such as Boeckx & Grohmann (2007), want to think of islands as something differ-
ent from phases, due to the possibility of extraction from phases by Movement to the
edge via the edge-feature. If phases allow Movement out of them, then why should any-
thing be an island at all? But the problem with thinking islands as different from phases
is that it is ad hoc, and it is possible to derive the existence of islands by assuming further
constraints on Movement, as Adger (2003) does.
If one does not wish to accept the conclusion that all phases and islands are pene-
trable by Agree but not Move, then this does not mean that we have to give up the ap-
proach proposed by this thesis. As we have briefly discussed, phases do allow the op-
portunity for cyclic Movement.
One could assume the existence of some unvalued feature on PRO, which is not
checked off until it Agrees with the control predicate as a reflex of the usual Agreement
proposed in Chapter 4 between the predicate and PRO. With Chomsky’s edge-feature,
PRO can move up to the edge of the phase, which is accessible to syntactic operations
under any account of phases, and Agree with the control predicate. This would derive
all of the control phenomena that we have seen in this thesis. Notice that, as PRO is
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phonologically silent, this does not have any effect on the surface structure of control
sentences. PRO would only be getting to the edge of the island, rather than escaping it.
A problem for this solution would be that it is ad hoc, and we shouldn’t assume the
existence of more unvalued features unless necessary. Furthermore, if islands are not
phases after all because they are too lax with movement and no syntactic operations can
occur inside an island whether or not an object is at the edge, then this approach can
never hope to account for adjunct control.
5.6 Concluding Remarks
In this section, I’ve given multiple reasons to think that Chomsky (1957)’s notion of a
syntax completely independent from semantics is not tenable in its strict sense, based on
evidence from subject control, and tough-predicates, when the presence of the semantic
easiness scale causes a predicate to have obligatory control. I’ve attempted to account
for the existence of non-obligatory control and introduced a mechanism for individual
variations in grammar.
Finally, I’ve tried to come up with a solution for control inside finite clauses and is-
lands, troubling for an account which relies on Agreement with PRO itself. I’ve con-
cluded that both weak and strong phases may block Movement but not Agreement.
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6 Conclusion
I’ve presented multiple facts in control phenomena that are difficult for any approach to
account for. First, PRO genuinely exists and it cannot be reduced to Movement. Second,
control is not a strict identity relation, as partial and split control exist; in fact, even cases
of split-partial control, where these two occur at the same time, exist. Finally, lexical se-
mantics plays an essential part in deriving control phenomena such as subject control
across a DP and OC in tough-predicates on the easiness scale.
After presenting contemporary approaches on control, I concluded that none of them
come very close to accounting for the multifarious phenomena seen in control struc-
tures across languages. The approach proposed in this thesis is able to derive the control
phenomena seen in Chapter 2 by assuming the existence of a control calculus, paired
alongside each control predicate. The control calculus has empty slots that is filled by
Agree, with the index of the DPs that the control predicate Probes for. When these slots
are filled, if the subset relation is satisfied rather than strict identity, this accounts for
partial and split control.
Some assumptions on the nature of phases and islands must be made for this ap-
proach to work, given the existence of control in island structures. It is up to syntacti-
cians to decide whether the approach proposed in this paper solves enough problems to
be worth the consequences that it brings along with it.
Before concluding the thesis, I would like to open up potential topics for future re-
search. This thesis remained ambiguous on the true nature of PRO, and it is indeed pos-
sible for this theory of control to not make any specific reference to PRO at all, merely
arguing that there is some kind of a subject that exists in the infinitival clauses of con-
trol structures that has a [u−R] feature, as we saw in Chapter 1. In addition, this thesis
has so far remained ambiguous as to whether control theory can be reduced to binding
theory, which was a source of controversy in the 1980s and 90s. However, the theory
proposed in this thesis may be able to shed light on both of these fundamental issues.
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It is a contradiction for PRO to be both anaphoric and pronomial at the same time,
given the unavoidable existence of PROarb. One way around this might be to claim that
PRO is simply not anaphoric, and it is a pronoun just like he, she, and so on. In fact, it is
very similar to little pro. The reason it seems like an anaphor is due to the control calcu-
lus and the Agreement features that force the indexes to be the same, but I assume that
this process differs from the one that makes true anaphors such as himself.
In that case, the fundamental difference between PRO and pro would be that PRO
simply cannot receive Case, so it is allowed only in Caseless embedded infinitival po-
sitions. The obvious problem with this is PRO seemingly getting accusative Case in Ice-
landic; one way around this might be to posit that little pro is present in control struc-
tures in Icelandic rather than PRO, for whatever reason. This idea predicts that little pro
should be independently present in Icelandic, which it did seem to be at least one point
in the past: Holmberg (2005) argues that early Icelandic is a language with little pro and
modern Icelandic is a partial null subject language.
Finally, this approach may predict a combined theory of control and binding. Many
of the tools used in this thesis, such as [R] features and index features, seem to be very
suitable for such a task. While I will not comment on the details of such a binding the-
ory here, it is theoretically fortuitous to assume the existence of a unified theory. At the
very least, a true anaphor such as himself would differ from a pseudoanaphor such as
PRO in that the former has a different process by which it is bound by a DP but the lat-
ter indirectly ends up sharing its index with its controller(s) due to the control calculus.
Assuming a distinction between genuine anaphors, and pseudoanaphors such as PRO
which are actually pronomial would solve the unsolved problem of the nature of the ex-
istence of PRO.
Regardless of whether or not one agrees with the approach proposed by this thesis,
the important role of lexical semantics in the syntax in deriving these sentences is less
controversial. The existence of promise and differences in obligatoriness in control with
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tough-predicates is strong evidence for a view of control in which syntax and semantics
are tightly interwined. We cannot have a view which completely ignores one side for
the sake of the other, as most approaches do today. Syntax, as well as semantics, play
important roles and collaborate with each other in an adequate account of control. This
thesis has made specific and explicit proposals as to how such collaborations between
these two components of grammar can proceed to cover all instances of control.
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Bošković, Željko. 2007. On the locality and motivation of Move and Agree: An even
more minimal theory. Linguistic Inquiry 38(4). 589–644.
Brody, Michael. 1993. Theta-theory and arguments. Linguistic Inquiry 24(1). 1–24.
Carnie, Andrew. 2013. Syntax: a generative introduction. West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.
Chierchia, Gennaro. 1984. Topics in the syntax and semantics of infinitives and gerunds: Uni-
versity of Massachusetts, Amherst dissertation.
Chierchia, Gennaro & Pauline Jacobson. 1986. Local and long-distance control. In Pro-
ceedings of the North Eastern Linguistic Society 16, 57–74. Amherst, MA: GLSA Publica-
tions.
Chomsky, Noam. 1957. Syntactic structures. The Hague: Mouton.
Chomsky, Noam. 1965. Aspects of the theory of syntax. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT
Press.
Chomsky, Noam. 1968. Language and mind. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World.
Chomsky, Noam. 1977. On wh-movement. In P. Culicover, T. Wasow & A. Akmajian
(eds.), Formal Syntax, New York, New York: Academic Press.
Chomsky, Noam. 1981. Lectures on government and binding. Dordrecht, The Netherlands:
Foris Publications.
79
Chomsky, Noam. 1982. Some concepts and consequences of the theory of government and bind-
ing. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Chomsky, Noam. 1986. Knowledge of language. New York, New York: Praeger Publishers.
Chomsky, Noam. 1995. The minimalist program. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Chomsky, Noam. 2000. Minimalist inquiries: The framework. In Roger Martin, David
Michaels & Juan Uriagereka (eds.), Step by step: Essays on minimalist syntax in honor of
Howard Lasnik, 89–156. MIT Press.
Chomsky, Noam. 2001. Derivation by phase. In Michael Kenstowicz (ed.), Ken Hale: A
life in linguistics, 1–52. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Chomsky, Noam & Morris Halle. 1968. The sound pattern of English. New York: Haper &
Row, Publishers.
Collins, Chris. 2005a. A smuggling approach to raising in English. Linguistic Inquiry
36(2). 289–298.
Collins, Chris. 2005b. A smuggling approach to the passive in English. Syntax 8(2). 81–
120.
Culicover, Peter W. & Ray Jackendoff. 2001. Control is not movement. Linguistic Inquiry
32(3). 493–512.
Epstein, Samuel David. 1984. Quantifier-PRO and the LF representation of PROarb.
Linguistic Inquiry 15(3). 499–504.
Farkas, Donca. 1988. On obligatory control. Linguistics and Philosophy 27–58.
Farrell, Patrick. 1995. Backward control in Brazilian Portuguese. In Proceedings of eastern
states conference on linguistics (escol 94), Columbia, South Carolina: ESCOL Publications
Committee.
Frantz, Donald G. 1973. On question word movement. Linguistic Inquiry 4(4). 531–534.
Fujii, Tomohiro. 2006. Some theoretical issues in Japanese control: University of Maryland
dissertation.
80
Heim, Irene & Angelika Kratzer. 1998. Semantics in generative grammar. Malden, MA:
Blackwell.
Hicks, Glyn. 2009. Tough-constructions and their derivation. Linguistic Inquiry 40(4).
535–566.
Holmberg, Anders. 2005. Is there a litte pro? evidence from Finnish. Linguistic Inquiry
36(4). 533–564.
Hornstein, Norbert. 1999. Movement and Control. Linguistic Inquiry 30(1). 69–96.
Hornstein, Norbert. 2001. Move!: A minimalist theory of construal. Oxford: Blackwell.
Kawasaki, Noriko. 1993. Control and arbitrary interpretation in English: University of Mas-
sachusetts at Amherst dissertation.
Koster, Jan. 1984. On binding and control. Linguistic Inquiry 15. 417–459.
Koster, Jan & Robert May. 1982. On the constituency of infinitives. Language 58. 116–143.
Landau, Idan. 1999. Elements of control: Massachusetts Institute of Technology disserta-
tion.
Landau, Idan. 2002. (un)interpretable neg in comp. Linguistic Inquiry 33(3). 465–492.
Landau, Idan. 2013. Control in generative grammar: A research companion. Cambridge,
England: Cambridge University Press.
Lasnik, Howard. 1992. Two notes on control and binding. In Richard K. Larson, Sabine
Iatridou, Utpal Lahiri & James Higginbotham (eds.), Control and grammar(48), 235–252.
Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Lebeaux, David. 1984. Anaphoric binding and the definition of PRO. In Proceedings of the
14th Meeting of the North East Linguistic Society (NELS 14), 253–274.
Lee, Felicia. 2003. Anaphoric R-expressions as bound variables. Syntax 6(1). 84–114.
Manzini, Maria Rita. 1983. On control and control theory. Linguistic Inquiry 14(3). 421–
446.
Nunes, Jairo. 1995. The copy theory of movement and linearization of chains in the Minimalist
Program: University of Maryland dissertation.
81
Pesetsky, David. 1987. Binding problems with experiencer verbs. Linguistic Inquiry 18(1).
126–140.
Polinsky, Maria & Eric Potsdam. 2002. Backward control. Linguistic Inquiry 33(2). 245–
282.
Postal, Paul M. 1970. On the surface verb ‘remind’. Linguistic Inquiry 1(1). 37–120.
Richards, Marc D. 2011. Probing the past: On reconciling long-distance agreement with
the PIC. In Artemis Alexiadou, Tibor Kiss & Gereon Muller (eds.), Local modelling of
non-local dependencies in syntax, Walter de Gruyter.
Rizzi, Luigi. 1990. Relativized minimality. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Rosenbaum, Peter S. 1967. The grammar of English predicate complement constructions.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Ross, John. 1967. Constraints on variables in syntax: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
dissertation.
Sigurðsson, Halldór Ármann. 1991. Icelandic case-marked PRO and the licensing of
lexical arguments. Natural Language and Linguistic Theory 9(2). 327–363.
Williams, Edwin. 1980. Predication. Linguistic Inquiry 11(1). 203–238.
Williams, Edwin. 1992. Adjunct control. In Richard K. Larson, Sabine Iatridou, Utpal
Lahiri & James Higginbotham (eds.), Control and grammar(48), 297–322. Dordrecht, The
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Deniz Satık
Education
2018– Ph.D. in Linguistics, Harvard University.
2016–2018 MA in Linguistics, Syracuse University.
Thesis: Control as Multiple Agree
Advisor: Jaklin Kornfilt
2011–2015 BA in Philosophy, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
Summa cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa, Honors with greatest distinction
Publications
2017 Satik, Deniz. The Little nP Hypothesis. In Proceedings of the Canadian Linguistic
Association. Toronto, ON.
Presentations
2016 "This My Dog" in Turkish, Dimensions of D Workshop, Rochester, NY.
Poster presented on September 17.
2017 The nP Hypothesis, Proceedings of the Canadian Linguistic Association, Toronto,
ON.
Talk presented on May 28.
Teaching Experience
2012 Tutor, Philosophy 110.
Work individually with students to go over the material covered in class.
2015 Tutor, Philosophy 595S.
Work individually with students to go over the material covered in class.
Awards and Honors
2012 Academic Achievement Award
2012 Alpha Lambda Delta
2012 Alpha Lambda Delta UMass Chapter Scholarship
2014 Phi Kappa Phi
2015 Five College Certificate in Logic
2015 Phi Beta Kappa
Languages
English Native or bilingual proficiency
Turkish Native or bilingual proficiency
Japanese Intermediate
